Monetary Unions: The Policy Coordination Issue
AbstractIn this paper we build a three-country dynamic model of a monetary union (MU), where we focus on how coalitions among policy-makers are formed and what are their effects on the stabilization of output and price. Some preliminary results based on numerical simulations are provided.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number 0504023.
Length: 6 pages
Date of creation: 16 Apr 2005
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Macroeconomic stabilization; coalitions; LQ differential games.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2005-04-24 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2005-04-24 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2005-04-24 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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