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Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: a dynamic game approach

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Author Info
Van Aarle B.
Engwerda J.
Plasmans J.

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Abstract

The interaction of monetary and fiscal policies is a crucial issue in a highly integrated economic area as the European Union. We investigate to which extent the EMU, that introduced a common monetary policy and restrictions on fiscal policy at the national level, benefits from macroeconomic policy cooperation due to the various interactions, spillovers and externalities from national macroeconomic policies. To study the effects of policy cooperation we compare the impact of three alternative policy regimes in a stylized dynamic model of the EMU: (i) non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policies, (ii) partial cooperation, and (iii) full cooperation both in symmetric and asymmetric settings where countries differ in structural characteristics, policy preferences and/or bargaining power. The paper introduces an analysis of coalitional behaviour in a dynamic setting into the literature.

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Paper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2001005.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2001005

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bindseil, Ulrich & Hantke, Cordula, 1997. "The power distribution in decision making among EU member states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 171-185, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laruelle, Annick & Widgrén, Mika, 1996. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power Among the EU States Fair?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Wage and Public Expenditure Setting in a Monetary Union," Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, vol. 6(1-2), pages 1-16, May - Nov. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Daniel Gros & Carsten Hefeker, 2000. "One Size Must Fit All. National Divergences in a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  5. Paul De Grauwe, 2000. "Monetary Policies in the Presence of Asymmetries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 593-612, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Engwerda, Jacob C. & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph E. J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 451-481, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1996. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper 1996022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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  8. De Grauwe, Paul, 2000. "Monetary Policies In The Presence Of Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 2393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Levinsky, Rene & Silarszky, Peter, 1998. "Voting Power and Coalition Formation: The Case of the Council of the EU," East European Series 56, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  1. van Aarle, Bas & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Engwerda, Jacob & Plasmans, Joseph, 2002. "Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-makers' Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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