This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Reinhard Neck
Engelbert Dockner
Abstract

In this paper, we consider a dynamic game model of two identical countries. Policy-makers of both countries have quadratic intertemporal objective functions and want to stabilize domestic output, domestic inflation, and the real rate of exchange. We present different analytical and numerical solutions for this policy game. Noncooperative open-loop equilibria are interpreted as requiring unilateral commitment and policy-makers' credibility. Potential gains from cooperation are present, as the noncooperative equilibrium solutions are not Pareto-optimal. Under an information pattern that admits memory strategies, the possibility of obtaining “cooperative†results without coordination and commitment arises. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00999041
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.

Volume (Year): 6 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 5-28
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:6:y:1995:i:1:p:5-28

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: policy coordination international macroeconomics stabilization policies dynamic game

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Turnovsky, Stephen J & Basar, Tamer & d'Orey, Vasco, 1988. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 341-61, June.
    Other versions:
  2. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1976. "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1161-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Turnovsky, Stephen J, 1991. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1443-45, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Haurie, Alain & Pohjola, Matti, 1987. "Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 65-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Broek, W.A. van den, 1999. "Moving horizon control in dynamic games," Discussion Paper 7, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. van Aarle, Bas & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Engwerda, Jacob & Plasmans, Joseph, 2002. "Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-makers' Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bas Van Aarle & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Arie Weeren, 2001. "Macroeconomic Policy Interaction under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-60, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Engwerda, J.C. & Aarle, B. van & Plasmans, J.E.J., 1998. "Fiscal policy interaction in the EMU," Discussion Paper 113, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Bas van Aarle, 2005. "Monetary Unions: The Policy Coordination Issue," Macroeconomics 0504023, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. W. A. van den Broek, 1999. "Moving-Horizon Control in Dynamic Games," Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 122, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Bas van Aarle & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2002. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design in the EMU: An Overview," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 321-340, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.