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Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism

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  • Haurie, Alain
  • Pohjola, Matti

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  • Haurie, Alain & Pohjola, Matti, 1987. "Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 65-78, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:11:y:1987:i:1:p:65-78
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Reinhard Neck, 1986. "Kann Stabilisierungspolitik unter Unsicherheit und Risiko "optimal" sein?," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 122(III), pages 509-534, September.
    2. Smala Fanokoa, Pascaux & Telahigue, Issam & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 935-946, June.
    3. Pierre Cahuc & Anne Bauer, 1989. "Conflits, inefficience du capitalisme et politique économique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(4), pages 621-648.
    4. Charles Morcom & Michael Kremer, 2000. "Elephants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 212-234, March.
      • Kremer, M. & Morcom, C., 1996. "Elephants," Working papers 96-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
      • Michael Kremer & Charles Morcom, 1996. "Elephants," NBER Working Papers 5674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Yohei Tenryu, 2017. "The role of the private sector under insecure property rights," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(3), pages 285-311, September.
    6. Guennady Ougolnitsky, 2014. "Game theoretic formalization of the concept of sustainable development in the hierarchical control systems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 220(1), pages 69-86, September.
    7. Stephen Polasky & Nori Tarui & Gregory Ellis & Charles Mason, 2006. "Cooperation in the commons," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 71-88, September.
    8. Tornell, Aaron, 1997. "Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 219-250, September.
    9. Elena M. Parilina & Puduru Viswanadha Reddy & Georges Zaccour, 2022. "Endogenous Duration of Long-term Agreements in Cooperative Dynamic Games with Nontransferable Utility," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 808-836, December.
    10. Tenryu, Yohei, 2013. "The Role of the Private Sector under Insecure Property Rights," MPRA Paper 74893, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Oct 2016.
    11. T. Ramamohan Rao, 1992. "Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 17-41, February.
    12. Rehme, G., 1997. "Economic Growth, (Re-)Distributive Policies, Capital Mobility and Tax Competition in Open Economies," Economics Working Papers eco97/24, European University Institute.
    13. Pavel Potužák, 2017. "Jaká je optimální míra úspor z pohledu příjemců úroků? [What is the Optimum Saving Rate from the Perspective of the Receivers of Interest?]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(1), pages 45-61.
    14. Elena Parilina & Georges Zaccour, 2016. "Strategic Support of Node-Consistent Cooperative Outcomes in Dynamic Games Played Over Event Trees," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-16, June.
    15. Martin-Herran, G. & Rincon-Zapatero, J.P., 2005. "Efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: theory and application to dynamic fishery games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1073-1096, June.
    16. C. González-Alcón & J. Sicilia & J. A. Álvarez, 1999. "Nash Equilibria in a Differential Game of Economic Growth," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 337-357, November.
    17. Houba, Harold & Sneek, Koos & Vardy, Felix, 2000. "Can negotiations prevent fish wars?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1265-1280, July.
    18. Javier Frutos & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2015. "Does Flexibility Facilitate Sustainability of Cooperation Over Time? A Case Study from Environmental Economics," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 165(2), pages 657-677, May.
    19. Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January.
    20. Coloma, German, 1999. "Capital accumulation and income distribution as the outcome of a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(8), pages 1177-1196, August.

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