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Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism

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  • Haurie, Alain
  • Pohjola, Matti

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 11 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 65-78

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Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:11:y:1987:i:1:p:65-78

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc

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Cited by:
  1. Charles Morcom & Michael Kremer, 2000. "Elephants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 212-234, March.
  2. Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January.
  3. Kremer, M. & Morcom, C., 1996. "Elephants," Working papers 96-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Houba, Harold & Sneek, Koos & Vardy, Felix, 2000. "Can negotiations prevent fish wars?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1265-1280, July.
  5. T. Ramamohan Rao, 1992. "Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 17-41, February.
  6. Martin-Herran, G. & Rincon-Zapatero, J.P., 2005. "Efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: theory and application to dynamic fishery games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1073-1096, June.
  7. Aaron Tornell, 1993. "Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 4354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Coloma, German, 1999. "Capital accumulation and income distribution as the outcome of a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(8), pages 1177-1196, August.
  9. Stephen Polasky & Nori Tarui & Gregory Ellis & Charles Mason, 2006. "Cooperation in the commons," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 71-88, September.
  10. Reinhard Neck, 1986. "Kann Stabilisierungspolitik unter Unsicherheit und Risiko "optimal" sein?," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 122(III), pages 509-534, September.
  11. Smala Fanokoa, Pascaux & Telahigue, Issam & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 935-946, June.

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