Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie.
Volume (Year): 55 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
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