Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights
AbstractThis paper introduces endogenous property rights into a neoclassical growth model. 1t identifies a mechanism that generates growth rates which are increasing at low levels of capital. and decreasing at high levels of capital. The driving force behind changes in property rights is the attempt of each rent-seeking group to secure exclusive access to a greater share of capital by excluding others. We characterize an equilibrium in which there is a shift from common to private property, followed by a switch back to common property.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4354.
Date of creation: May 1993
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 2, no. 3 (September 1997): 219-250.
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Other versions of this item:
- Tornell, Aaron, 1997. " Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 219-50, September.
- Aaron Tornell, 1995. "Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1739, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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