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Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights

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Author Info
Aaron Tornell

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Abstract

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Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 1739.

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Date of creation: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1739

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Romer, Paul M, 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Baumol, William J & Wolff, Edward N, 1988. "Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1155-59, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hendricks, Kenneth & Wilson, Charles, 1987. "Equilibrium in Preemption Games with Complete Information," Working Papers 87-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1981. "On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(3), pages 395-405, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Rebelo, Sergio, 1991. "Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(3), pages 500-521, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Azariadis, Costas & Drazen, Allan, 1990. "Threshold Externalities in Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 501-26, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1989. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1171-1214, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paul J. Zak, 2002. "Institutions, Property Rights, and Growth," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 68(1), pages 55-73. [Downloadable!]
  2. Falkinger, Josef & Grossmann, Volker, 2004. "Institutions and Development: The Interaction between Trade Regime and Political System," IZA Discussion Papers 1242, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Thomas Gall & Paolo Masella, 2007. "A Tale of Markets and Jungles in a Simple Model of Growth," JEPS Working Papers 07-004, JEPS. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roland Hodler, 2004. "Redistribution to Rent Seekers, Foreign Aid and Economic Growth," Diskussionsschriften dp0406, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
  5. Congdon Fors, Heather & Olsson, Ola, 2005. "Endogenous Institutional Change After Independence," Working Papers in Economics 163, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Alejandro Diaz Bautista & Mauro Diaz Dominguez, 2004. "Capital Humano y Crecimiento Económico en México (1970-2000). Human Capital and Economic Growth in Mexico," Urban/Regional 0405008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Oguzhan Dincer & Christopher Ellis, 2005. "Predation, Protection, and Accumulation: Endogenous Property Rights in an Overlapping Generations Growth Model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 435-455, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Roland Hodler, 2007. "Rent seeking and aid effectiveness," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 525-541, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Cuberes, David, 2008. "Democracy, Diversification, and Growth Reversals," MPRA Paper 8430, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Paul J. ZAK, 2002. "Institutions, Property Rights and Growth," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2002014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  11. Gradstein, Mark, 2003. "Governance and economic growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3098, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  12. Gradstein, Mark, 2002. "Governance and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3270, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Svensson, Jakob, 1997. "Collusion Among Interest Grops: Foreign Aid and Rent Dissipation," Seminar Papers 610, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  14. Roland Benabou, 1997. "Inequality and Growth," NBER Working Papers 5658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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