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Conflits, inefficience du capitalisme et politique économique

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  • Pierre Cahuc
  • Anne Bauer

Abstract

[fre] Conflits, inefficience du capitalisme et politique économique. . Cet article analyse, dans une perspective dynamique, les conséquences sur la croissance du conflit pour le partage du revenu. Après avoir étudié la robustesse de la propriété d"inefficience du capitalisme mise en évidence par Lancaster (1973), dans le cadre d'un horizon infini, il montre que toute politique d'investissement public (respectivement de taxe sur l'investissement), avec un budget équilibré, entraîne à la fois une diminution (resp. une augmentation) du taux de croissance et des gains des salariés et des capitalistes. Ce résultat paradoxal s'explique par le fait que l'État, les salariés, et les capitalistes, désirent des mesures de politique économique qui sont sous-optimales à l'équilibre lorsqu'ils raisonnent en prenant les actions des autres joueurs comme données. Cela permet de retrouver la critique de Lucas et de la dépasser en montrant que les acteurs sociaux sont victimes d'un sophisme de composition auquel Pohjola [1984] n'a pas échappé lorsqu'il a démontré l'efficacité des fonds d'investissement des salariés. [eng] Conflict, dynamic inefficiency of capitalism and economic policy. . This paper analyses the relationship between distribution and growth in a differential game à la Lancaster (1973). Having established that the results of Lancaster and Pohjola (1983) about the inefficiency of capitalisrn survive in an infinite horizon game, we show that any budget-balanced public investment (resp : tax on investment) inakes rate ot growth and the gains of capitalists and workers to decrease (resp : to increase,. This paradox can be explained as follows : as they take others players' actions as given, the governrnent the workers and the eapitalists wish policies which are suboptinial at ecjuilibrinrn. This statement illustrates « Lucas' critique » and snggests that players are victims of a fallacy of composition. From that point of view, we show that the version of the Lancaster model used by Pohjola (1984) in order to show the efficiency of workers' investment funds does not allow to avoid this fallacy ol composition.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Cahuc & Anne Bauer, 1989. "Conflits, inefficience du capitalisme et politique économique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(4), pages 621-648.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1989_num_40_4_409158
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1989.409158
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1989.409158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hoel, Michael, 1978. "Distribution and Growth as a Differential Game between Workers and Capitalists," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 19(2), pages 335-350, June.
    2. Pohjola, Matti, 1983. "Nash and stackelberg solutions in a differential game model of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 173-186, September.
    3. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
    4. Haurie, Alain & Pohjola, Matti, 1987. "Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 65-78, March.
    5. Daniel Cohen & Philippe Michel, 1988. "How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(2), pages 263-274.
    6. Pohjola, Matti, 1983. "Workers' investment funds and the dynamic inefficiency of capitalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 271-279, March.
    7. Pohjola, Matti, 1984. " Union Rivalry and Economic Growth: A Differential Game Approach," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(3), pages 365-370.
    8. Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct.
    9. Basar, Tamer & Haurie, Alain & Ricci, Gianni, 1985. "On the dominance of capitalists leadership in a Feedback-Stackelberg solution of a differential game model of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 101-125, September.
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