International monetary policy cooperation in economies with centralized wage setting
AbstractWe consider a standard two-country monetary policy game with fixed nominal wage contracts. The policy regime is either non-cooperative or cooperative. We extend conventional analyses by deriving the natural rate of employment endogenously through monopoly union decision-making. As unions attempt to affect the real exchange rate, wages are set inefficiently high. Such attempts are shown to be strongest under monetary cooperation. Therefore, in comparison with non-cooperation, employment is lowest, and, in effect, consumer price inflation is highest, under monetary cooperation, i.e., international monetary cooperation is disadvantageous. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.
Volume (Year): 4 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323
monetary policy games; international policy coordination; monopoly unions;
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