1. Turnovsky, Stephen J & Basar, Tamer & d'Orey, Vasco, 1988. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 341-61, June.
   Other versions:
   • Stephen J. Turnovsky & Tamer Basar & Vasco d'Orey, 1988. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies," NBER Working Papers 2467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Brigitte Godbillon & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2001. "Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 163-179, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Laura Piscitelli, 1999. "EMU in Reality: The Effect of a Common Monetary Policy on Economies with Different Transmission Mechanisms," Empirica, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 337-358, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Piscitelli, Laura, 1999. "EMU in Reality: The Effect of a Common Monetary Policy on Economies with Different Transmission Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 2068, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Dixit, Avinash, 2000. "A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 759-80, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Hughes Hallett, A J & Ma, Yue, 1996. "Changing Partners: The Importance of Coordinating Fiscal and Monetary Policies within a Monetary Union," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(2), pages 115-34, June.
7. Levine, Paul, 1993. "Fiscal Policy Co-ordination under EMU and the Choice of Monetary Instrument," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(0), pages 1-12, Suppl..
8. Buti, Marco & Franco, Daniele & Ongena, Hedwig, 1998. "Fiscal Discipline and Flexibility in EMU: The Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 81-97, Autumn.
9. Daniel Gros & Carsten Hefeker, 2000. "One Size Must Fit All. National Divergences in a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Daniel Gros & Carsten Hefeker, 2002. "One Size Must Fit All: National Divergences in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 3(3), pages 247-262, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Paul De Grauwe, 2000. "Monetary Policies in the Presence of Asymmetries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 593-612, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Engwerda, Jacob C. & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph E. J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 451-481, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. De Grauwe, Paul, 2000. "Monetary Policies In The Presence Of Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 2393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," Discussion Paper 59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," DELTA Working Papers 95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    • Beetsma,Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg,A. Lans, 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    • Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2003. "Is a conservative central banker a (perfect) substitute for wage coordination?," Macroeconomics 0307011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Bartolomeo, 2004. "Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 281-294, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Bartolomeo, 2004. "Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 281-294, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2005. "Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination And Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Macroeconomics 0504024, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2004. "Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination And Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Working Papers 74, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]