Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination

Contents:

Author Info

  • René Cabral-Torres

Abstract

Motivated by the accession of new member states into the European Union, this paper examines the appeal of taking part in a large monetary union from the perspective of small open economies. Consistent with existing findings in the literature, we show that in the absence of fiscal policy considerations, taking part in a large monetary union is counterproductive for a small economy. Nevertheless, once the role of fiscal policy is properly incorporated, taking part in the monetary union becomes desirable from a social perspective. Following these results, we explore the prospects of engaging both economies in fiscal coordination and on how different schemes of policy synchronization can provide the grounds to make cooperation beneficial for the members of a monetary union. We find that when monetary and fiscal authorities cooperate and attempt to exploit externalities for their own benefit, a Pareto efficient outcome can be achieved if fiscal policy in the monetary union is coordinated by a central authority and such authority acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the central bank. Our analysis suggests that this regime result superior to (i) a monetary union in which fiscal authorities conduct their policy in an independent or (ii) coordinated fashion, (iii) to a regime where both authorities internalize the effects of their own externalities by allowing the central bank to act as Stackelberg leader and (iv) event to a regime in which the small open economy decides to stay out of the monetary union.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2005/0528.pdf
File Function: Main text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 05/28.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:05/28

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom
Phone: (0)1904 323776
Fax: (0)1904 323759
Email:
Web page: http://www.york.ac.uk/economics/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Common central bank; policy co-ordination; monetary union; monetary leadership; fiscal leadership;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Michael Kiley, 2004. "Is Moderate-To-High Inflation Inherently Unstable?," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 193, Econometric Society.
  2. Lane, P, 1999. "Asymmetric Shocks and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union," Trinity Economics Papers 994, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
  3. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Martin, Philippe, 1995. "Free-riding, convergence and two-speed monetary unification in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1345-1364, August.
  5. Rantala, Anssi, 2001. "Does monetary union reduce employment?," Research Discussion Papers 7/2001, Bank of Finland.
  6. Bas van Aarle & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2001. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 437, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Franc Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," IHEID Working Papers 04-2001, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  8. Clausen, Volker & Wohltmann, Hans-Werner, 2002. "Monetary and fiscal policy dynamics in an asymmetric monetary union," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 119, University of Duisburg-Essen, Faculty for Economics and Business Administration.
  9. Rafael Domenech & Javier Andres & Antonio Fatas, 2006. "The Stabilizing Role of Government Size," Working Papers 0603, International Economics Institute, University of Valencia, revised Jan 2007.
  10. Engwerda, J.C. & Aarle, B. van & Plasmans, J.E.J., 1998. "Fiscal Policy Interaction in the EMU," Discussion Paper 1998-113, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
  12. Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph, 2001. "Monetary Union: The Ins and Outs of Strategic Delegation," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 69(3), pages 285-309, June.
  13. Ghironi, Fabio & Giavazzi, Francesco, 1998. "Currency areas, international monetary regimes, and the employment-inflation tradeoff," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 259-296, August.
  14. Van Aarle B. & Engwerda J. & Plasmans J., 2001. "Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: a dynamic game approach," Working Papers 2001005, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  15. Markus Knell & Helmut Stix, 2003. "How Robustare Money Demand Estimations? A Meta-Analytic Approach," Working Papers 81, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
  16. L. Lambertini & R. Rovelli, 2003. "Monetary and fiscal policy coordination and macroeconomic stabilization. A theoretical analysis," Working Papers 464, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  17. Giavazzi, Francesco & Giovannini, Alberto, 1989. "Monetary Policy Interactions under Managed Exchange Rates," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(222), pages 199-213, May.
  18. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson, 1991. "Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031787, December.
  19. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 371-396.
  20. repec:fth:bfdipa:7/2001 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
  22. Lane, Philip R., 1996. "Stabilization policy in a currency union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-60, October.
  23. Lodovico Pizzati, 2000. "Monetary Policy Coordination and the Level of National Debt," Empirica, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 389-409, December.
  24. Barry Eichengreen & Fabio Ghironi, 2002. "Transatlantic Trade-Offs in the Age of Balanced Budgets and European Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 381-411, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:05/28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Hodgson).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.