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Designing Fiscal Institutions in a Monetary Union

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Author Info
Brigitte Godbillon
Moïse Sidiropoulos ()

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Abstract

This article explores the policy and wealth consequences of alternative institutional arrangements through which fiscal policy interacts with monetary policy in a monetary union such as the EMU. The central issue of the article is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal institutions through a comparison of alternative arrangements to distribute power over monetary and fiscal authorities between the central authority of the union and the individual members of the union and evaluating their performance. The main results of this article reveal that delegation of the fiscal policy to a council of country representatives and the monetary policy to a council of governors is the appropriate institutional design to reduce inflation bias and better stabilize regional, idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks in a monetary union. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008332429778
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.

Volume (Year): 12 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 163-179
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Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:12:y:2001:i:2:p:163-179

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100323

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Related research
Keywords: monetary union; policy mix; federalism;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jürgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Waller, Christopher J, 1989. "Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank Politics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 422-31, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Waller, Christopher J & Walsh, Carl E, 1996. "Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1139-53, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in a Second-Best World," Discussion Paper 47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Süppel, Ralph & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1994. "Central Bank Constitutions for Monetary Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers 919, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. von Hagen, Jurgen & Suppel, Ralph, 1994. "Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 774-782, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Barry Eichengreen., 1990. "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?," Economics Working Papers 90-151, University of California at Berkeley.
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Cited by:
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  1. Laurent GAGNOL & Moise SIDIROPOULOS, 2001. "The policy mix in a monetary union under alternative policy institutions and asymmetries," Working Papers of BETA 2001-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bas van Aarle & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2002. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design in the EMU: An Overview," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 321-340, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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