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Staying together or breaking apart: Policy-makers' endogenous coalitions formation in the European economic and monetary Union

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Author Info
Van Aarle B.
Di Bartolomeo G.
Engwerda J.
Plasmans J.

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within the EMU by focusing, in a dynamic set-up, on asymmetries, externalities, and the existence of a multi-country context. We study how coalitions among fiscal and monetary authorities are formed and what are their effects on the stabilization of output and price. In particular, our attention is directed to study the consequences on these issues of different institutional contexts in which policy-makers may act. Among other results, we found that, in the presence of externalities, the occurrence of asymmetries is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cooperation.

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Paper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2002013.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2002013

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Turnovsky, Stephen J & Basar, Tamer & d'Orey, Vasco, 1988. "Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 341-61, June.
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  2. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Frank, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Engwerda, J. C., 1998. "Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash equilibrium in linear quadratic games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1487-1506, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Svensson, L.E.O., 1999. "Monetary Policy Issues for the Eurosystem," Papers 667, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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  7. Hughes Hallett, A J & Ma, Yue, 1996. "Changing Partners: The Importance of Coordinating Fiscal and Monetary Policies within a Monetary Union," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(2), pages 115-34, June.
  8. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ecchia, Giulio & Mariotti, Marco, 1998. "Coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 573-582, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Engwerda, Jacob C. & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph E. J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 451-481, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kohler, Marion, 2002. "Coalition formation in international monetary policy games," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 371-385, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Carlo Carraro, 1997. "Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination," Empirica, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 163-177, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Van Aarle B. & Engwerda J. & Plasmans J., 2001. "Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: a dynamic game approach," Working Papers 2001005, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Reinhard Neck & Engelbert Dockner, 1995. "Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Mariotti, Marco, 1997. "A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 196-217, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Sack, Brian, 2000. "Does the fed act gradually? A VAR analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 229-256, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Alessandra Casella, 1999. "Tradable deficit permits:efficient implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 14(29), pages 321-362, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Bas van Aarle & Tomasz Michalak, 2005. "Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in the EMU: Spillovers, Asymmetries, and Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Bas van Aarle, 2005. "Monetary Unions: The Policy Coordination Issue," Macroeconomics 0504023, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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