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Strategic Interactions between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in a Multi-Country New-Keynesian Model of a Monetary Union

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  • Tomasz Michalak
  • Jacob Engwerda
  • Joseph Plasmans

Abstract

In this paper we consider a number of key issues related to the policy coordination in a monetary union that has been recently discussed in the literature. To this end we propose a multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union cast in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. Our framework can be used to simulate strategic interactions between an arbitrary number of fiscal authorities interacting in coalitions with or against the common central bank. For many parameter combinations our results confirm the findings of Beetsma et al. (2001) that for symmetric inflation and output gap shocks, fiscal coordination between all the countries is counter-productive within a monetary union. The clash between the central bank and the coalition of national governments is most intense under a symmetric inflation shocks when there is strong conflict concerning the orientation of stabilisation policies. This conflict is less pronounced under an asymmetric inflation and output gap shocks, however, still makes fiscal cooperation unattractive. We extend the existing New-Keynesian literature on policy coordination by considering not only cases of non-coordination, fiscal cooperation and the grand coalition, but also the partial cooperation arrangements between fiscal players. We show that, in many cases, partial fiscal coordination of a subgroup of fiscal players is more efficient, from the social point of view, than non-coordination. However, this regime still delivers poor results from the perspective of individual players. This occurs especially in the case of asymmetric shocks, as the countries directly affected by the shocks tend to "export" losses to the countries with whom they form a coalition. Furthermore, we show that the common objective of the grand coalition is of the upmost importance for the outcome of the stabilisation process.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2534.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2534

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Keywords: macroeconomic stabilisation; EMU; policy coordination; linear quadratic differential games;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Flotho, Stefanie, 2012. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union under the Zero Lower Bound constraint," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62028, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Nicola Acocella, . "The theoretical roots of EMU institutions and policies during the crisis," Working Papers 126/14, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
  3. Nicola Acocella, . "A tale of two cities: exit policies in Washington and Frankfurt," Working Papers 117/13, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
  4. Boldea, O. & Engwerda, J.C. & Michalak, T. & Plasmans, J.E.J. & Salmah, S., 2011. "A Simulation Study of an ASEAN Monetary Union (Replaces CentER DP 2010-100)," Discussion Paper 2011-098, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Stefanie Flotho, 2012. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union under the Zero Lower Bound constraint," Discussion Paper Series 20, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Jun 2012.
  6. Engwerda, J. & Boldea, O. & Michalak, T. & Plasmans, J. & Salmah,, 2012. "A simulation study of an ASEAN monetary union," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1870-1890.

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