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Stability Criteria and Convergence: The Role of the System of National Accounts for Fiscal Policy in Europe

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Author Info
Tilman Brück
Andreas Cors
Klaus F. Zimmermann
Rudolf Zwiener

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Abstract

The standardisation of the European systems of national accounts has progressed significantly in recent years. Some room for interpretation remains in regard to some accounting standards, the periodicity of the data, and the quality of the forecasts of budget deficits. Yet national accounts data of the eurozone countries are now a reliable basis for macroeconomic policy decisions. The stability and growth pact of the eurozone countries relies heavily on one indicator of fiscal discipline, the budget deficit as a share of gross domestic product. Drawing from simulation evidence of the German economy, it is argued that fulfilling the deficit target is no guarantee for achieving output stabilisation. The pact hence fails to internalise the externalities arising from a decentralised fiscal policy in the European monetary union. The deficit target could be replaced with an expenditure target. Given the macroeconomic policy objectives of the euro economies it would be more appropriate to hand the supervision of an amended stability pact to an independent council of economic experts. Such council could assess the macroeconomic environment more carefully and could have the authority to caution and fine fiscally irresponsible eurozone governments.

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Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 318.

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Length: 27 p.
Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp318

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Related research
Keywords: Simulation; fiscal policy; international policy coordination;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C82 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Macroeconomic Data
E37 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Forecasting and Simulation
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Uhlig, Harald, 2002. "One Money, but Many Fiscal Policies in Europe: What Are the Consequences?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Artis, Michael J & Buti, Marco, 2000. ""Close to Balance or in Surplus": A Policy Maker's Guide to the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact," CEPR Discussion Papers 2515, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Buti, Marco & Sapir, André, 2001. "EMU in the Early Years: Differences and Credibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 2832, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Frank, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, 2000. "The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers," NBER Working Papers 7662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Buti, Marco & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Franco, Daniele, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Donatella Gatti, 2002. "Co-ordinating fiscal authorities in the euro-zone: a key role for the ECB," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 56-71, January.
  9. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Buti, Marco & Franco, Daniele & Ongena, Hedwig, 1998. "Fiscal Discipline and Flexibility in EMU: The Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 81-97, Autumn.
  11. Paul De Grauwe, 2000. "Monetary Policies in the Presence of Asymmetries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 593-612, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. De Grauwe, Paul, 2000. "Monetary Policies In The Presence Of Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 2393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Fabrizio Balassone & Daniele Franco, 2000. "Public investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘golden rule’," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 207-229, June. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Tilman Brück & Rudolf Zwiener, 2004. "Fiscal Policy Rules for Stabilisation and Growth: A Simulation Analysis of Deficit and Expenditure Targets in a Monetary Union," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 427, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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