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William George Stanford

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This is information that was supplied by William Stanford in registering through RePEc. If you are William George Stanford , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: William
Middle Name: George
Last Name: Stanford
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pst204

Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
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Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Chicago
Location: Chicago, Illinois (United States)
Homepage: http://www.uic.edu/depts/econ/
Email:
Phone: 312-996-2683
Fax: 312-996-3344
Postal: University Hall 2101, Mail Code 144, 601 South Morgan Street, Chicago, Illinois 60607
Handle: RePEc:edi:deuicus (more details at EDIRC)

Works

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Working papers

  1. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1983. "Conjectural Variations Strategies in Dynamic Cournot Games With Fast Reactions," Discussion Papers 575, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1982. "Duopoly, Conjectural Variations and Supergames," Discussion Papers 525, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Stanford, William, 2011. "A family of identities related to zero-sum and team games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 91-94, September.
  2. Stanford, William, 2010. "The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 352-354, September.
  3. Stanford, William, 2004. "Individually rational pure strategies in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 221-233, April.
  4. Stanford, William, 2004. "Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 341-345, December.
  5. Stanford, William, 2000. "On comparing equilibrium and optimum payoffs in a class of discrete bimatrix games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 13-20, January.
  6. Stanford, William, 1999. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.
  7. Stanford, William, 1997. "On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 115-127, April.
  8. Stanford, William, 1991. "Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 129-144, February.
  9. Stanford, William, 1989. "Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 139-143, December.
  10. Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988. "A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 177-86.
  11. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
  12. Stanford, William G., 1986. "Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 226-232, June.
  13. Stanford, William G., 1986. "On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 233-250, June.
  14. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1985. "Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 133-152, June.

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