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Information about:
William George Stanford

Personal Details | Affiliation | Works
This is information that was supplied by William Stanford in registering through RePEc. If you are William George Stanford , you may change this information at RePEc. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at RePEc. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

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Personal Details

First Name: William
Middle Name: George
Last Name: Stanford
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RePEc Short-ID: pst204

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Affiliation

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Works

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Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics | Citations (if any)| NEP Fields |
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML (with abstracts), plain text (with abstracts), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

  1. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  2. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1983. "Conjectural Variations Strategies in Dynamic Cournot Games With Fast Reactions," Discussion Papers 575, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

  3. Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1982. "Duopoly, Conjectural Variations and Supergames," Discussion Papers 525, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]


Articles

  1. Stanford, William, 2004. "Individually rational pure strategies in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 221-233, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  2. Stanford, William, 2004. "Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 341-345, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  3. Stanford, William, 2000. "On comparing equilibrium and optimum payoffs in a class of discrete bimatrix games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 13-20, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  4. Stanford, William, 1999. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  5. Stanford, William, 1997. "On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 115-127, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  6. Stanford, William, 1991. "Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 129-144, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  7. Stanford, William, 1989. "Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 139-143, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  8. Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988. "A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 177-86.

  9. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  10. Stanford, William G., 1986. "Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 226-232, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  11. Stanford, William G., 1986. "On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 233-250, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  12. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1985. "Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 133-152, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)


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This page was last updated on 2009-12-11.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.