Personal Details
First Name: William
Middle Name: George
Last Name: Stanford
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID: pst204
Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
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Affiliation
(in no particular order)
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Chicago
Location: Chicago, Illinois (United States)
Homepage: http://www.uic.edu/depts/econ/
Email:
Phone: 312-996-2683
Fax: 312-996-3344
Postal: University Hall 2101, Mail Code 144, 601 South Morgan Street, Chicago, Illinois 60607
Handle: RePEc:edi:deuicus (registered authors at this institution)
Works
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Working papers
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Discussion Papers
679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Published as: - Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1983.
"Conjectural Variations Strategies in Dynamic Cournot Games With Fast Reactions,"
Discussion Papers
575, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1982.
"Duopoly, Conjectural Variations and Supergames,"
Discussion Papers
525, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Articles
- Stanford, William, 2004.
"Individually rational pure strategies in large games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 221-233, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Stanford, William, 2004.
"Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 341-345, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Stanford, William, 2000.
"On comparing equilibrium and optimum payoffs in a class of discrete bimatrix games,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 13-20, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Stanford, William, 1999.
"On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Stanford, William, 1997.
"On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 115-127, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Stanford, William, 1991.
"Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 129-144, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Stanford, William, 1989.
"Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 139-143, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988.
"A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 177-86.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: - Stanford, William G., 1986.
"Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 226-232, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Stanford, William G., 1986.
"On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 233-250, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1985.
"Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 133-152, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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