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Monetary trading: An Optimal Exchange System

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Author Info

  • Guilherme Carmona

    (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

Abstract

We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible trading system of the same complexity. Thus, we rationalize the monetary nature of real-world trade as being an efficient way to achieve those properties.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0309/0309004.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0309004.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 05 Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309004

Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on XP; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 48 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Monetary Trading; Social Institutions;

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  10. Champ,Bruce & Freeman,Scott & Haslag,Joseph, 2011. "Modeling Monetary Economies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107003491, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Carmona, Guilherme & Leoni, Patrick, 2003. "Equilibrium Non-Panic Bank Failures," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp424, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.

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