Repeated Random Matching Games under Restricted Information. Part I: Equilibria
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 95/19.
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Postal: Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom
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Web page: http://www.york.ac.uk/economics/
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- Guilherme Carmona, 2003.
"Monetary trading: An Optimal Exchange System,"
Game Theory and Information
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2002.
"Social Norms and Monetary Trading,"
FEUNL Working Paper Series
wp418, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
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