Monetary Trading: An Optimal Exchange System
AbstractWe show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we will show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible trading system of the same complexity. Thus, we rationalize the monetary nature of real-world trade as being an efficient way to achieve those properties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia in its series FEUNL Working Paper Series with number wp420.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
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