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Evolved Perception and Behaviour in Oligopolies

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  • Robert E. Marks

    ()
    (University of New South Wales, Sydney)

Abstract

A previous study, which examined oligopolists as responding simply to past prices of their strategic rivals, used data from a mature market with stable rules of thumb (mappings from past actions or states of the market to present prices) for the oligopolists' behaviour, whether purposefully learnt or emerging from the natural selection of the rivalry. The earlier study imposed exogenous partitions on the action space, as perceived by the players. This study explores how such perceptions might be endogenised. A firm answer to the question of how oligopolists partition their perceptions of others' actions, both through time and across the price space, will also provide information on how much or how little information they choose to use: in short, how boundedly rational oligopolists are. We use data from a retail coffee market to examine the evolved optimal partitioning and mapping of price space, manifest as the oligopolists' rules of thumb.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 with number _038.

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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf6:_038

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Postal: Department of Econometrics, University of Geneva, 102 Bd Carl-Vogt, 1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
Web page: http://www.unige.ch/ce/ce96/welcome.html
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  1. Dow, James, 1991. "Search Decisions with Limited Memory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 1-14, January.
  2. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
  3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1990. "Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-117, June.
  4. Samet, Dov, 1990. "Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 190-207, October.
  5. Slade, Margaret E, 1992. "Vancouver's Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise in Uncovering Supergame Strategies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 257-76, April.
  6. John Geanakoplos, 1989. "Game Theory Without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 914, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Dimitri, Nicola, 1993. "Learning partitions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 195-199.
  8. David F. Midgley & Robert E. Marks & Lee C. Cooper, 1997. "Breeding Competitive Strategies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(3), pages 257-275, March.
  9. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
  10. Barton L. Lipman, 1993. "Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey," Working Papers 872, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Leigh Tesfatsion, 2002. "Agent-Based Computational Economics," Computational Economics 0203001, EconWPA, revised 15 Aug 2002.
  2. Jasmina Arifovic & Alexander Karaivanov, 2007. "Learning by Doing vs. Learning from Others in a Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers dp07-24, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

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