Prediction, Optimization and Learning in Repeated Games
AbstractThis paper shows that, in many infinitely repeated games, if players optimize with respect to beliefs that satisfy a diversity condition termed neutrality, then each player will choose a strategy that his opponent was certain would not be played. This is an obstacle to formulation of a learning theory in which Nash equilibrium behavior is a necessary long-run consequence of optimization by cautious players.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 576.
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- John H. Nachbar, 1997. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 275-310, March.
- John H. Nachbar, 1995. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9504001, EconWPA, revised 14 Feb 1996.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-18 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Lawrence Blume & David Easley, 1993. "Rational Expectations and Rational Learning," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9307003, EconWPA.
- Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
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