Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability
AbstractIn games with costless preplay communication, some strategies are more complex than others in the sense that they induce a finer partition of the set of states of the world. This paper shows that if the concept of evolutionary stability, which is argued to be a natural solution concept for communication games, is modified to take lexicographic complexity preferences into account, then for a class of games of common interest only communication strategies that induce payoff-dominant Nash outcomes of the underlying game are stable.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received April 1998/Final version September 1998
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Warneryd, K., 1993. "Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability," Discussion Paper 1993-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Warneryd, K., 1993. "Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability," Papers 9313, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Luca Anderlini, 1995.
"Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games,"
Game Theory and Information
- Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
- Anderlini, L., 1990. "Communication, Computability And Common Interest Games," Papers 159, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
- Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August.
- Damme, E.E.C. van, 1993. "Evolutionary game theory," Discussion Paper 1993-75, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007.
"Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution,"
Carlo Alberto Notebooks
61, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution," Working Papers hal-00354224, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.