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Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Anderlini, Luca
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 27 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 1-37
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:27:y:1999:i:1:p:1-37Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Paper Luca Anderlini, 1995.
"Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games ,"
Game Theory and Information
9510003, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Anderlini, L., 1990.
"Communication, Computability And Common Interest Games ,"
Papers
159, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Warneryd Karl, 1993.
"Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989.
"Cooperation and bounded recall ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988.
"A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games ,"
MIT Press Books ,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
Farrell, Joseph, 1988.
"Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Keser, Claudia & Vogt, Bodo, 0000.
"Why do experimental subjects choose an equilibrium which is neither risk nor payoff dominant ,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
00-40, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
[Downloadable!]
Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008.
"Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games ,"
Working Papers
08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: repec:att:wimass:1919982 is not listed on IDEAS
Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2007.
"When Does Communication Improve Coordination? ,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
680, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 19 Jun 2008.
[Downloadable!]
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