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Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games

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Author Info
Luca Anderlini (St. John's College, Cambridge)

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Abstract

This paper provides a theory of equilibrium selection for one-shot two- player finite-action strategic-form common interest games. A single round of costless unlimited pre-play communication is allowed. Players are restricted to use strategies which are computable in the sense of Church's thesis. The equilibrium notion used involves perturbations which are themselves computable. The only equilibrium payoff vector which survives these strategic restrictions and the computable perturbations is the unique Pareto-efficient one.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9510003.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 19 Oct 1995
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9510003

Note: Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on EmTex - PC; to print on PostScript 600DPI; pages: 39; figures: included
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Common Interest Games; Computability; Pre-play Communication;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  2. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Keser, Claudia & Vogt, Bodo, 0000. "Why do experimental subjects choose an equilibrium which is neither risk nor payoff dominant," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 00-40, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games," Working Papers 08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. repec:att:wimass:1919982 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2007. "When Does Communication Improve Coordination?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 680, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 19 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
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