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Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata

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  • K. Binmore
  • L. Samuelson
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    Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 561.

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    Date of creation: 10 Dec 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:561

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
    2. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1990. "Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-117, June.
    4. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
    5. A. J. Robson, 2010. "Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake," Levine's Working Paper Archive 540, David K. Levine.
    6. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
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    Cited by:
    1. Binmore, Ken & Piccione, Michele & Samuelson, Larry, 1998. "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 257-291, June.
    2. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-284, December.
    3. Conlon, John R., 2003. "Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 35-65, September.
    4. Luca Anderlini & Hamid Sabourian, . ""Cooperation and Computability in N-Player Games''," CARESS Working Papres 97-15, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    5. Kolstad, Ivar, 2007. "The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 58-72, February.
    6. Knoblauch, Vicki, 2000. "Lexicographic orders and preference representation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 255-267, October.
    7. Knoblauch, Vicki, 2005. "Continuous lexicographic preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 812-825, November.

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