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• Fernando Vega-Redondo
• V Bhaskar

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 103 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 334-350
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:2:p:334-350

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Praveen Kujal & Juan Ruiz, 2003. "Policy Synchronization and Staggering in a Dynamic Model of Strategic Trade," International Trade 0302003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
2. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000178, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
3. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2007. "Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 210, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University. [Downloadable!]
4. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme, 2007. "One - Memory in Repeated Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp500, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
5. Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000560, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Roger Lagunoff & Hans Haller, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Game Theory and Information 9707006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
6. Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-02, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001627, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2006. "Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 199, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.