Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration
Abstract
We analyze the incentives for a controlling shareholder to acquire silent or controlling shares in a competitor. When it occurs, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or to the target, or even to both. The ownership structure of firms turns out to be a key variable. The possession of initial silent toeholds in rivals unambiguously encourages further partial acquisitions, both controlling and silent. However, a higher initial controlling share generally stimulates controlling acquisitions, but always discourages silent ones. Finally, indirect acquisitions through the controlled firm are always controlling and preferred when the targeted block is small.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 165 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 508-534
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2007. "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration," CEPN Working Papers hal-00143911, HAL.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Malueg, D.A., 1990.
"Collusive Behavior And Partial Ownership Of Rivals,"
Papers
90-9, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Malueg, David A., 1992. "Collusive behavior and partial ownership of rivals," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 27-34, March.
- Patricia Charlety & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2001. "Prises de participations et expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires," Working Papers 2001-42, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Karle, Heiko & Klein, Tobias J. & Stahl, Konrad O., 2011.
"Ownership and control in a competitive industry,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
11-071, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Karle, H. & Klein, T.J. & Stahl, K.O., 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," Discussion Paper 2011-013, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Karle, Heiko & Klein, Tobias & Stahl, Konrad O, 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 8277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Karle, Heiko & Klein, Tobias J. & Stahl, Konrad O., 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 350, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Heiko Karle & Tobias J. Klein & Konrad O. Stahl, 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 3380, CESifo Group Munich.
- Karle, H. & Klein, T.J. & Stahl, K.O., 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," Discussion Paper 2011-026, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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