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Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control

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  • Jovanovic, Dragan
  • Wey, Christian

Abstract

We analyze the impact of passive partial ownership (PPO) on horizontal mergers. We show that antitrust authorities ignoring the effects of previous PPO acquisitions invite sneaky takeovers: a PPO is strategically used prior to a full takeover to get a merger approved which is in fact detrimental to consumers.

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  • Jovanovic, Dragan & Wey, Christian, 2014. "Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 32-35.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:1:p:32-35
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.006
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    Cited by:

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    3. Hassan Benchekroun & Miao Dai & Ngo Van Long, 2020. "On the Profitability of Cross-Ownership in Cournot Oligopolies: Stock Sizes Matter," CIRANO Working Papers 2020s-43, CIRANO.
    4. Dai, Miao & Benchekroun, Hassan & Long, Ngo Van, 2022. "On the profitability of cross-ownership in Cournot nonrenewable resource oligopolies: Stock size matters," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    5. Heim, Sven & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Spiegel, Yossi, 2017. "Minority share acquisitions and collusion: Evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-037, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Hongkun Ma & Chenhang Zeng, 2022. "The effects of optimal cross holding in an asymmetric oligopoly," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(4), pages 1053-1066, October.
    7. Maria Rosa Battaggion & Vittoria Cerasi, 2021. "It takes two to tango: Interlockings and Partial Equity Ownership," Working Papers 475, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2021.
    8. Li, Sanxi & Ma, Hongkun & Zeng, Chenhang, 2015. "Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 37-40.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Horizontal mergers; (Passive) Partial ownership; Antitrust; Synergies; Sneaky takeovers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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