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Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

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  • David Gilo
  • Yossi Moshe
  • Yossi Spiegel
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00005.x
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 1 (03)
    Pages: 81-99

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:37:y:2006:i:1:p:81-99

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    Cited by:
    1. Foros, Øystein & Kind, Hans Jarle & Shaffer, Greg, 2010. "Mergers and Partial Ownership," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 1/2010, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
    2. Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos & Campo Corredera, María Luz, 2011. "Partial cross-ownership and strategic environmental policy," IKERLANAK 2011-47, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    3. Shelegia, Sandro & Spiegel, Yossi, 2012. "Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 136-138.
    4. Fiocco, Raffaele, 2014. "The strategic value of partial vertical integration," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 455, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    5. Alberto Zazzaro, 2011. "The Costs of Inter-Firm Networks," QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, issue 4, December.
    6. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Welfare effects of cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly," Discussion Papers 2011/125, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    7. Fanti, Luciano, 2013. "Cross-ownership and unions in a Cournot duopoly: When profits reduce with horizontal product differentiation," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 34-40.
    8. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars & Tag, Joacim, 2012. "Buying to Sell: Private Equity Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring," CEPR Discussion Papers 8992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Lu, Jingfeng, 2012. "Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 561-575.
    10. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00143911 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Cross-participated firms and welfare," Discussion Papers 2011/127, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    12. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Cross-ownership and unions in a Cournot duopoly: when profits reduce with horizontal product differentiation," Discussion Papers 2011/128, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    13. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2013. "Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 267-277.
    14. Doruk İriş & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2013. "Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 50-65, February.
    15. Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz & María Luz Campo, 2010. "Wage bargaining and partial ownership," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 37(1 Year 20), pages 27-42, June.
    16. Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Shengping, zsp@gsm.pku.edu.cn & Zhu, Dandan, 2009. "On Pairwise Stability and Anti-Competitiveness of Cross-Holdings in Oligopoly," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt08m3q5dw, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    17. Jovanovic, Dragan & Wey, Christian, 2013. "Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeover, and merger control," DICE Discussion Papers 102, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    18. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Product differentiation and duopoly: when social welfare benefits from cross-shareholding," Discussion Papers 2011/129, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

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