Mergers, managerial incentives, and efficiencies
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- Jovanovic, Dragan, 2013. "Mergers, managerial incentives, and efficiencies," DICE Discussion Papers 88, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
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Cited by:
- Gamal Atallah, 2016. "Endogenous Efficiency Gains from Mergers," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(1), pages 202-235, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
Managerial Incentives; Horizontal Mergers; Merger Control; Productive Efficiency Gains; Synergies; Efficiency Defense;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2014-06-14 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2014-06-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2014-06-14 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-EFF-2014-06-14 (Efficiency and Productivity)
- NEP-HRM-2014-06-14 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-IND-2014-06-14 (Industrial Organization)
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