David Gilo () (Tel Aviv University) Yossi Moshe () (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) Yossi Spiegel () (Tel Aviv University)
Abstract
We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firmsÕ controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=view&year=2006&issue=spr&page=81.
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Volume (Year): 37 (2006) Issue (Month): 1 (Spring) Pages: 81-99 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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