Ownership and control in a competitive industry
AbstractWe study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry profits are maximized within a symmetric two product monopoly, the investor attains this only in exceptional cases. Instead, she sometimes acquires a noncontrolling stake. Or she invests asymmetrically rather than pursuing a full takeover if she acquires a controlling one. Generally, she invests indirectly if she only wants to affect the product market outcome, and directly if acquiring shares is profitable per se. --
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 11-071.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
differentiated products; separation of ownership and control; private benefits of control;
Other versions of this item:
- Karle, H. & Klein, T.J. & Stahl, K.O., 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," Discussion Paper 2011-013, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Heiko Karle & Tobias J. Klein & Konrad O. Stahl, 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 3380, CESifo Group Munich.
- Karle, Heiko & Klein, Tobias & Stahl, Konrad O, 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 8277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Karle, Heiko & Klein, Tobias J. & Stahl, Konrad O., 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 350, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Karle, H. & Klein, T.J. & Stahl, K.O., 2011. "Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry," Discussion Paper 2011-026, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-02-20 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-02-20 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-02-20 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Foros, Øystein & Jarle Kind, Hans & Shaffer, Greg, 2011.
"Mergers and partial ownership,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 916-926.
- Foros, Øystein & Kind, Hans Jarle & Shaffer, Greg, 2010. "Mergers and Partial Ownership," Discussion Papers 2010/15, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
- Oystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind & Greg Shaffer, 2010. "Mergers and Partial Ownership," CESifo Working Paper Series 2912, CESifo Group Munich.
- Foros, Øystein & Kind, Hans Jarle & Shaffer, Greg, 2010. "Mergers and Partial Ownership," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 1/2010, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics.
- Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2009.
"Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 508-534, September.
- Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2007. "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration," CEPN Working Papers hal-00143911, HAL.
- Malueg, David A., 1992.
"Collusive behavior and partial ownership of rivals,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 27-34, March.
- Malueg, D.A., 1990. "Collusive Behavior And Partial Ownership Of Rivals," Papers 90-9, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
"Law and Finance,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Yohanes E. Riyanto & Linda A. Toolsema, 2004.
"Tunneling and Propping: A Justification for Pyramidal Ownership,"
Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings
639, Econometric Society.
- Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Toolsema, Linda A., 2008. "Tunneling and propping: A justification for pyramidal ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 2178-2187, October.
- Yohanes E. Riyanto & Linda A. Toolsema, 2004. "Tunneling and Propping: A Justification for Pyramidal Ownership," Departmental Working Papers wp0409, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Toolsema, Linda A., 2004. "Tunneling and Propping: A Justification for Pyramidal Ownership," Research Report 04E29, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Matthew J. Clayton & Bjorn N. Jorgensen, 2005. "Optimal Cross Holding with Externalities and Strategic Interactions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1505-1522, July.
- Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
- Victor Dorofeenko & Larry Lang & Klaus Ritzberger & Jamsheed Shorish, 2008. "Who controls Allianz?," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 75-103, January.
- Hunold, Matthias & Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Stahl, Konrad, 2012.
"Backwards integration and strategic delegation,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
12-022, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.