European takeover regulation
[‘Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate control’]
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Cited by:
- Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008.
"Recent developments in German corporate governance,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM db2cef31-d47e-445d-ba35-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Discussion Paper 2004-014, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Goergen, M. & Manjon, M.C. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM f1cb70de-0638-4cfc-baf6-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Matt Glendening & Inder K. Khurana & Wei Wang, 2016. "The market for corporate control and dividend policies: Cross-country evidence from M&A laws," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 47(9), pages 1106-1134, December.
- Sergey Stepanov, 2010.
"Shareholder access to manager‐biased courts and the monitoring/litigation trade‐off,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 270-300, June.
- Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "Shareholder Access to Manager-Biased Courts and the Monitoring/Litigation Tradeoff," Working Papers w0106, New Economic School (NES).
- Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "Shareholder Access to Manager-Biased Courts and the Monitoring/Litigation Tradeoff," Working Papers w0106, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Marc Goergen, 2005.
"Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 21(2), pages 243-268, Summer.
- Goergen, M. & Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Other publications TiSEM e09dd6cf-98ae-44e9-bdbb-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Goergen, M. & Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Discussion Paper 2005-017, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Goergen, M. & Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Discussion Paper 2005-63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Goergen, M. & Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Other publications TiSEM a78ee12f-8ac2-4866-b3d9-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Ehrhardt, Olaf & Lahr, Henry, 2008. "Uncertain private benefits and the decision to go public," CEFS Working Paper Series 2008-02, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
- Sergey Stepanov, 2012.
"Takeovers under Asymmetric Information: Block Trades and Tender Offers in Equilibrium,"
Working Papers
w0185, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Sergey Stepanov, 2012. "Takeovers under Asymmetric Information: Block Trades and Tender Offers in Equilibrium," Working Papers w0185, New Economic School (NES).
- Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Nielsen, 2004. "The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 259-283, May.
- Vlachos, Jonas, 2004.
"Does Regulatory Harmonization Increase Bilateral Asset Holdings?,"
Working Paper Series
612, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Vlachos, Jonas, 2004. "Does Regulatory Harmonization Increase Bilateral Asset Holdings?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Köhler, Matthias, 2008. "Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-110, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2013.
"Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?,"
Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 88-107.
- Hubert de La Bruslerie, 2013. "Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?," Post-Print halshs-00937543, HAL.
- Hubert de La Bruslerie, 2010. "The Equal Opportunity Rule in Transfer of Control: A Contractual Model," Post-Print halshs-00636613, HAL.
- Marc Goergen & Miguel Manjon & Luc Renneboog, 2008. "Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(1), pages 37-71, March.
- Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars & Vlachos, Jonas, 2006. "Cross-Border Acquisitions and Corporate Taxes: Efficiency and Tax Revenues," Working Paper Series 663, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Pajuste, Anete, 2005. "Determinants and consequences of the unification of dual-class shares," Working Paper Series 465, European Central Bank.
- Albuquerque, Rui & Schroth, Enrique, 2008.
"Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Enrique Schroth & Rui Albuquerque, 2008. "Determinants Of The Block Premium And Of Private Benefits Of Control," 2008 Meeting Papers 655, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Wang, Ying & Lahr, Henry, 2017.
"Takeover law to protect shareholders: Increasing efficiency or merely redistributing gains?,"
Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 288-315.
- Ying Wang & Henry Lahr, 2016. "Takeover Law to Protect Shareholders: Increasing Efficiency or Merely Redistributing Gains?," Working Papers wp486, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
- Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008.
"One Share - One Vote: the Theory,"
Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
- Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2007. "One Share - One Vote: The Theory," SIFR Research Report Series 57, Institute for Financial Research.
- Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2008. "One share - one vote: the theory," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69545, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Eckbo, B. Espen, 2009. "Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 149-178, February.
- Matthias Köhler, 2012. "Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 173-196, August.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/3189 is not listed on IDEAS
- Thraya, Mohamed Firas & Hamza, Taher, 2019. "Bidder excess control, target overpayment and control contestability: Evidence from France," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 178-190.
- Roberto Barontini & Lorenzo Caprio, 2006. "The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 12(5), pages 689-723, November.
- Santella, Paolo & Baffi, Enrico & Drago, Carlo & Lattuca, Dino, 2008. "A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Obstacles to Institutional Investor Activism in Europe and in the US," MPRA Paper 8929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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