This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Köhler, Matthias
Abstract

Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector. The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe. --

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/27593/1/dp08110.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 08-110.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:7500

Contact details of provider:
Postal: L 7,1; D - 68161 Mannheim
Phone: +49/621/1235-01
Fax: +49/621/1235-224
Email:
Web page: http://www.zew.de/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (ZBW - German National Library for Economics).

Related research
Keywords: Banks; blockholdings; corporate governance; hostile takeovers; takeover directive;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C. & Smith, Clifford Jr., 1988. "Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 267-291, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Renee Adams & Hamid Mehran, 2003. "Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 123-142. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marc Goergen, 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 243-268, Summer.
  6. Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Nielsen, 2004. "The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 259-283, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stephen Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Working Papers 95-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, 2003. "The corporate governance of banks," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 91-107. [Downloadable!]
  9. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  11. Goergen, Marc & Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Corporate governance convergence: evidence from takeover regulation reforms in Europe," Discussion Paper 63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 427-454, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Abe de Jongand & Rezaul Kabir & Teye Marra & Ailsa Roell, . "Ownership and Control in the Netherlands," Working Papers 1999.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  15. Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q III, pages 24-36. [Downloadable!]
  16. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. repec:fth:tilbur:9996 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, . "Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK," Working Papers 1999.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  20. Gillan, Stuart L. & Starks, Laura T., 2000. "Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 275-305, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Becht, M. & Chapelle, A. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 1999. "Shareholding cascades : the separation of ownership and control in Belgium," Discussion Paper 96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  22. Levine, Ross, 2005. "Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 865-934 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Rafel Crespi-Cladera & Miguel A. Garcia-Cestona, . "Ownership and Control: A Spanish Survey," Working Papers 1999.23, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  24. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by editing a NEP report.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.