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The Control of Corporate Europe

Editor

Listed:
  • Barca, Fabrizio
    (Italian Finance Ministry and University of Sienna)

  • Becht, Marco
    (European Corporate Governance Institute and Free University of Brussels)

Abstract

Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements. Contributors to this volume - Jonas Agnblad (Nordic Capital - leveraged buy-out fund in Stockholm) Fabrizio Barca (Italian Treasury/Sienna University) Marco Becht (Institute for European Studies/Solvay Business School/Universite Libre de Bruxelles) Erik Berglof (Stockholm School of Economics/CEPR) Marcello Bianchi (Consob - Stock Exchange and Public Companies Italian Authority) Magda Bianco (Bank of Italy) Laurence Bloch (Technical Adviser, French Foreign Trade Ministry) Ekkehart Boehmer (New York Stock Exchange) Ariane Chapelle (Solvay Business School/Universite Libre de Bruxelles) Rafel Crespi-Cladera (Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona) Abe de Jong (Erasmus University, Rotterdam) Luca Enriques (University of Bologna) Miguel Garcia-Cestona (Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona) Marc Goergen (UMIST) Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) Peter Hogfeldt (Stockholm School of Economics) Rezaul Kabir (University of Tilburg) Susanne Kalss (University of Klagenfurt) Elizabeth Kremp (Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry, France) Teye Marra (University of Groningen) Colin Mayer (Said Business School) Luc Renneboog (University of Tilburg) Ailsa Roell (Princeton University) Alex Stomper (University of Vienna) Helena Svancar (Enskilda Securities - Nordic investment bank) Josef Zechner (University of Vienna)

Suggested Citation

  • Barca, Fabrizio & Becht, Marco (ed.), 2002. "The Control of Corporate Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199257539.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199257539
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Raffaele Santioni & Ilaria Supino, 2018. "Internal capital markets in Italian business groups: evidence from the financial crisis," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 421, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. An Buysschaert & Marc Deloof & Marc Jegers & An Rommens, 2008. "Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Developed Countries? Belgian Evidence," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(6), pages 504-518, November.
    3. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2017. "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-35, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Amonboev Makhammadsidik, 2019. "Increasing the Effectiveness of Investment Management by Introducing Corporate Governance in Joint-Stock Companies," Journal of International Business Research and Marketing, Inovatus Services Ltd., vol. 4(5), pages 7-12, July.
    5. Josep A. Tribo & Pascual Berrone & Jordi Surroca, 2007. "Do the Type and Number of Blockholders Influence R&D Investments? New evidence from Spain," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 828-842, September.
    6. Ararat, Melsa & Claessens, Stijn & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2021. "Corporate governance in emerging markets: A selective review and an agenda for future research," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    7. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2009. "Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pages 508-534, September.
    8. Isabel Gutierrez & Jordi Surroca, 2014. "Revisiting corporate governance through the lens of the Spanish evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(4), pages 989-1017, November.
    9. Gourevitch, Peter, 2002. "Collective action problems in monitoring managers the Enron case as a systemic problem," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 3(3), pages 3-16.
    10. Edward Jones & Hao Li & Oluwagbenga Adamolekun, 2022. "Excess Cash Holdings, Stock Returns, and Investment Organicity: Evidence from UK Investment Announcements," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 58(4), pages 603-647, December.
    11. Schmid, Thomas & Ampenberger, Markus & Kaserer, Christoph & Achleitner, Ann-Kristin, 2010. "Controlling shareholders and payout policy: do founding families have a special 'taste for dividends'?," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-01, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
    12. Patricia Charletty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2004. "Real Market Concentration through Partial Acquisitions," Working Papers 2004-07, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    13. Chaur‐Shiuh Young & Liu‐Ching Tsai & Pei‐Gin Hsieh, 2008. "Voluntary Appointment of Independent Directors in Taiwan: Motives and Consequences," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(9‐10), pages 1103-1137, November.
    14. Wladimir Andreff, 2003. "Le gouvernement d’entreprise à l’Est : vers un modèle de contrôle centre-européen ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 72(3), pages 173-199.
    15. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2017. "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power," Working Papers hal-04141634, HAL.

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