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A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Zevgolis Nikolaos E.

    (Commissioner, Hellenic Competition Commission, 7 Gavriilidou street 11141, Athens, Greece)

  • Fotis Panagiotis N.

    (Commissioner, Hellenic Competition Commission, 5 P. Ioakim street Peristeri Attikis, 12132, Athens, Greece)

Abstract

In this interdisciplinary paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects and the practicability and applicability of passive (non-controlling) minority interests within the existing Merger Regulation system [Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24/1]. The empirical evidences from existing economic literature and case law show that the existence of an enforcement gap in European Union competition law regarding the anticompetitive effects of non-controlling minority interests has not been confirmed so far. Therefore, there is no space, at least to date, for a per se ruling in the European Union Law for the assessment of passive minority interests, but for a Rule of Reason approach, based on a case by case analysis. The Commission should continue to investigate non-controlling transactions and, in the future, an ex post assessment/quantification of their anticompetitive effects, based on existing (or settled) case law and economic theory, should be at the core of its agenda.

Suggested Citation

  • Zevgolis Nikolaos E. & Fotis Panagiotis N., 2019. "A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 1-41, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:15:y:2019:i:3:p:41:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0041
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    passive minority interests; merger regulation; case law; oligopoly theory; European commission;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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