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Interlocking Directorates: An Italian Antitrust Dilemma

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  • Valeria Falce

Abstract

The detrimental effects deriving from the widespread diffusion of interlocking directorates in the financial sector have been recently addressed by the Italian legislator. The new regulation, prohibiting personal links as such, swings between two focal points: the first is aimed at promoting a competitive marketplace, and the second one at fostering a more ethical environment based on diligence, correctness, and fairness. Both extremes perform a very precious function, balancing the undesirable consequences coming from the sole application of the other. In order to maximize the benefits of the new regulation, reducing its downsides, some amendments are suggested. As a result of their introduction, neutral social networks will be recognized and preserved, whereas those that represent the “superficial layer” of a broader pathological functioning of specific financial markets will be detected and appropriately eliminated.

Suggested Citation

  • Valeria Falce, 2013. "Interlocking Directorates: An Italian Antitrust Dilemma," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 457-472.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:457-472.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nht002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Bartolomeo & Paolo Canofari, 2015. "Interlocking Directorates and Concentration in the Italian Insurance Market," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 351-362, December.
    2. Panitz Robert & Glückler Johannes, 2023. "Post-Brexit: Do board interlocks make banks take similar relocation decisions?," ZFW – Advances in Economic Geography, De Gruyter, vol. 67(2), pages 127-141, August.
    3. Zevgolis Nikolaos E. & Fotis Panagiotis N., 2019. "A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 1-41, November.
    4. Battaggion, Maria Rosa & Cerasi, Vittoria, 2020. "Strategic interlocking directorates," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 85-101.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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