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Partial ownership arrangements in the Japanese automobile industry; 1990-2000

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Abstract

The end of the 1990Â’s saw a number of foreign automobile manufacturers become the largest shareholders in several Japanese automobile manufacturers. It seems logical to conclude that a firm only enters into a partial ownership arrangement (POA) if it is profit maximizing. However, research to date has treated POAs as if exogenous to the model. This paper develops a model that assumes POAs are determined endogenously. Data for the Japanese automobile industry are then used to investigate the factors that determine whether a firm enters into a POA, and the effects a POA has on the price-cost margin. The findings of this paper suggest that while both foreign and domestic firms take an interest in product mix when exploring POAs in the Japanese market, they have differing profit incentives. Furthermore, the level of ownership has a positive effect on POAs.

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  • Hiroshi Ono & Takuya Nakazato & Colin Davis & Wilson Alley, 2004. "Partial ownership arrangements in the Japanese automobile industry; 1990-2000," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 7, pages 355-367, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:7:y:2004:n:2:p:355-367
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    1. Clarke, Roger & Davies, Stephen & Waterson, Michael, 1984. "The Profitability-Concentration Relation: Market Power or Efficiency?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(4), pages 435-450, June.
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    5. Wilson A. Alley, 1997. "Partial Ownership Arrangements and Collusion in the Automobile Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 191-205, June.
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    2. Hassan Benchekroun & Miao Dai & Ngo Van Long, 2020. "On the Profitability of Cross-Ownership in Cournot Oligopolies: Stock Sizes Matter," CIRANO Working Papers 2020s-43, CIRANO.
    3. Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos & Campo, María Luz, 2017. "Taxes versus standards under cross-ownership," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 36-50.
    4. Kanjilal, Kiriti & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2018. "Common Pool Resources with Endogenous Equity Shares," Working Papers 2018-4, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    5. Panagiotis N. Fotis & Michael L. Polemis & Konstantinos Eleftheriou, 2017. "Unilateral effects of partial acquisitions: consistent calculation of GUPPI under horizontal merger guidelines within the EU," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 44(3), pages 315-325, September.
    6. Dong, Quan & Chang, Yang-Ming, 2020. "Emission taxes vs. environmental standards under partial ownership arrangements," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 250-262.
    7. Leheyda, Nina, 2008. "Geographical and Multi-product Linkages of Markets: Impact on Firm Equilibrium Interactions (Some Evidence from the European Car Market)," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-119, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Fanti, Luciano, 2016. "Social welfare and cross-ownership in a vertical industry: When the mode of competition matters for antitrust policy," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37, pages 8-16.
    9. Arghya Ghosh & Hodaka Morita, 2017. "Knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(4), pages 1044-1067, December.
    10. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2016. "Passive unilateral cross-ownership and strategic trade policy," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 10, pages 1-22.
    11. Zevgolis Nikolaos E. & Fotis Panagiotis N., 2019. "A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 1-41, November.
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    13. Kanjilal Kiriti & Muñoz-García Félix, 2020. "Endogenous Equity Shares in Cournot Competition: Welfare Analysis and Policy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-21, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    partial ownership arrangements; price-cost margin; technology transfers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
    • L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing

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