IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jculte/v42y2018i3d10.1007_s10824-017-9314-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Determinants of sales and price at auction for three Australian Indigenous artists: to pool or not to pool?

Author

Listed:
  • Lisa Farrell

    (RMIT University)

  • Jane M. Fry

    (Monash University)

  • Tim R. L. Fry

    (RMIT University)

Abstract

Albert Namatjira (1902–1959), Emily Kame Kngwarreye (c1910–1996) and Rover (Julama) Thomas (c1926–1998) are three of Australia’s best-known Indigenous artists. Each is known for one style of painting—Namatjira for watercolor on paper, Kngwarreye for acrylic (synthetic polymer) on canvas and Thomas for natural earth pigments on canvas. We estimate a sample selectivity model using data from the Australian Art Sales Digest to study the determinants of sales and the hammer price of artworks offered at auction from these artists. The results show that pre-sale information on the artwork and auction effects are significant and that the three artists studied are very different from each other. Thus, data should not be pooled when estimating these models.

Suggested Citation

  • Lisa Farrell & Jane M. Fry & Tim R. L. Fry, 2018. "Determinants of sales and price at auction for three Australian Indigenous artists: to pool or not to pool?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 42(3), pages 507-520, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:42:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s10824-017-9314-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10824-017-9314-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10824-017-9314-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10824-017-9314-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marta Herrero, 2010. "Performing Calculation In The Art Market," Journal of Cultural Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 19-34, March.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    3. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    4. Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni, 2012. "Tribal art market: signs and signals," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 36(4), pages 289-308, November.
    5. Marinelli, Nicoletta & Palomba, Giulio, 2011. "A model for pricing Italian Contemporary Art paintings at auction," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 212-224, May.
    6. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tim R. L. Fry, 2020. "Heterogeneity in Auction Price Distributions for Australian Indigenous Artists," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 96(313), pages 177-186, June.
    2. Régis Blazy & Marie Blum, 2022. "Horizontal and vertical differentiation in comic art auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1382-1415, July.
    3. Lisa Farrell & Jane M. Fry & Tim R. L. Fry, 2021. "Gender differences in hammer prices for Australian Indigenous art," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 45(1), pages 1-12, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marie BLUM, 2021. "Auction hosts: are they really impartial?," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2021-09, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    2. Lisa Farrell & Tim R.L. Fry, 2017. "Pre-sale information and hammer prices for Australian Indigenous art," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(5), pages 483-500, November.
    3. Mezzetti, Claudio & Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2008. "Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 591-609, March.
    4. Wedad Elmaghraby, 2005. "The Effect of Asymmetric Bidder Size on an Auction's Performance: Are More Bidders Always Better?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(12), pages 1763-1776, December.
    5. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, July.
    6. Chonawee Supatgiat & John R. Birge & Rachel Q. Zhang, 2002. "Optimal Bidding Strategies in Non-Sealed Bid Online Auctions of Common Products with Quantity Uncertainty," Game Theory and Information 0211005, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Mar 2003.
    7. Amar Cheema & Dipankar Chakravarti & Atanu R. Sinha, 2012. "Bidding Behavior in Descending and Ascending Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 779-800, September.
    8. Adam, Marc T.P. & Krämer, Jan & Müller, Marius B., 2015. "Auction Fever! How Time Pressure and Social Competition Affect Bidders’ Arousal and Bids in Retail Auctions," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 468-485.
    9. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    10. Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Shobe, William & Smith, Vernon & Winn, Abel, 2009. "The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 190-200, February.
    11. Rod Garratt & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 753-769, May.
    12. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Yoon, Kiho, 2008. "The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 324-336, February.
    14. Schilizzi, Steven & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2009. "Predicting the performance of conservation tenders when information on bidders's costs is limited," 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia 48171, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    15. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Haan, Marco, 2001. "Sellers' Hedging Incentives at EPA's Emission Trading Auction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 286-294, May.
    16. Pinar Keskinocak & Shidhar Tayur, 2001. "Quantitative Analysis for Internet-Enabled Supply Chains," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 70-89, April.
    17. Rachel R. Chen & Robin O. Roundy & Rachel Q. Zhang & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2005. "Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 467-482, March.
    18. Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Orzach, Ram & Sela, Aner, 2002. "Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 247-258, May.
    19. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    20. Sergio Galletta & Mario Jametti & Agustin Redonda, 2015. "Highway to Economic Growth? Competition in Public Works Tenders in the Democratic Republic of Congo," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 83(2), pages 240-252, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pooled data; Selectivity correction; Auction prices; Indigenous artwork;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:42:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s10824-017-9314-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.