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Tribal art market: signs and signals

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  • Guido Candela
  • Massimiliano Castellani
  • Pierpaolo Pattitoni

Abstract

In this paper, we present a model for the marketability of a Tribal artwork, and we test this model empirically using a unique hand-collected dataset, which comprises the worldwide Tribal art market auctions between 1999 and 2008. Our results show a significant relationship between the probability of an artwork to be sold and several signs and signals. The effect of the auction estimated prices on the probability of sales is nonlinear and allows us to divide the Tribal art market into two price regimes. In the low-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is negative. In the high-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is positive. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

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  • Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni, 2012. "Tribal art market: signs and signals," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 36(4), pages 289-308, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:36:y:2012:i:4:p:289-308
    DOI: 10.1007/s10824-012-9162-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Antonello Eugenio Scorcu, 2018. "On the relationship between reserve prices and low estimates in art auctions," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 42(1), pages 45-56, February.
    2. Edward Oczkowski, 2021. "The catalogue raisonné and art auction prices: the case of Berthe Morisot," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 1669-1687, September.
    3. Régis Blazy & Marie Blum, 2022. "Horizontal and vertical differentiation in comic art auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1382-1415, July.
    4. Federica Codignola & Paolo Mariani, 2022. "Investigating preferences in art collecting: the case of the François Pinault Collection," Italian Journal of Marketing, Springer, vol. 2022(1), pages 107-133, March.
    5. Angelini, Francesco & Castellani, Massimiliano, 2022. "Price and information disclosure in the private art market: A signalling game," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 14-20.
    6. Bertacchini, Enrico & Friel, Martha, 2014. "Determining the Value of Modern and Contemporary Furniture Design: an Exploratory Investigation," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201437, University of Turin.
    7. Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Antonello Eugenio Scorcu, 2012. "Visual artist price heterogeneity," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 1(3), pages 16-22.
    8. Grigoroudis, Evangelos & Noel, Laurent & Galariotis, Emilios & Zopounidis, Constantin, 2021. "An ordinal regression approach for analyzing consumer preferences in the art market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(2), pages 718-733.
    9. Anne-Sophie V. E. Radermecker, 2019. "Artworks without names: an insight into the market for anonymous paintings," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 43(3), pages 443-483, September.
    10. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2022. "Overconfidence in the art market: a bargaining pricing model with asymmetric disinformation," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 39(3), pages 961-988, October.
    11. Lisa Farrell & Jane M. Fry & Tim R. L. Fry, 2018. "Determinants of sales and price at auction for three Australian Indigenous artists: to pool or not to pool?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 42(3), pages 507-520, August.
    12. Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Laura Vici, 2015. "Pricing Visitor Preferences for Temporary Art Exhibitions," Tourism Economics, , vol. 21(1), pages 83-103, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tribal art; Signs; Signals; Veblen effect; Conspicuous consumption; C25; D44; Z11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities

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