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Hedonic Models and Pre-Auction Estimates: Abstract Art Revisited

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  • Calin Valsan

    ()
    (Bishop's University)

  • Robert Sproule

    ()
    (Bishop's University)

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    Abstract

    We investigate the predictive power of hedonic models compared to that of pre-auction estimates in the context of art auctions. We use a panel data consisting of abstract paintings and a methodology that employs the estimates as instrumental variables in the framework of a hedonic regression model. The results suggest that hedonic models have no better predictive power than that of the estimates. Pre-auction estimates appear to fully account for the available public information on works of art.

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2006/Volume26/EB-06Z10132A.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

    Volume (Year): 26 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 5 ()
    Pages: 1-10

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    Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06z10132

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    1. Clare M D'Souza & David Prentice, 2001. "Auctioneer Strategy and Pricing: Evidence from an Art Auction," Working Papers 2001.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    2. BAUWENS, Luc & GINSBURGH, Victor, . "Art experts and auctions are pre-sale estimates unbiased and fully informative?," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1485, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    4. Beggs, A. & Graddy, K., 1996. "Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers 99184, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    5. Chanel, O. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1996. "Auction Theory and Practice Evidence from the Market for Jewellery," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 96b05, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    6. Robert Ekelund & Rand Ressler & John Watson, 1998. "Estimates, Bias and “No Sales” in Latin-American Art Auctions, 1977–1996," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 33-42, March.
    7. Werner Pommerehne & Lars Feld, 1997. "The Impact of Museum Purchase on the Auction Prices of Paintings," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 249-271, September.
    8. Corinna Czujack & Maria Fraga Martins, 2004. "Do art specialists form unbiased pre-sale estimates? An application for Picasso paintings," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(4), pages 245-249.
    9. Richard J. Agnello, 2002. "Investment Returns and Risk for Art: Evidence from Auctions of American Paintings," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 443-463, Fall.
    10. Jianping Mei & Michael Moses, 2005. "Vested Interest and Biased Price Estimates: Evidence from an Auction Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(5), pages 2409-2435, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Ventura Charlin & Arturo Cifuentes, 2013. "A new financial metric for the art market," Papers 1309.6929, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2013.
    2. Charlin, Ventura & Cifuentes, Arturo, 2013. "A new financial metric for the art market," MPRA Paper 50186, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. François Maréchal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2012. "The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 323-330, December.

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