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Hedonic Models and Pre-Auction Estimates: Abstract Art Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Calin Valsan

    (Bishop's University)

  • Robert Sproule

    (Bishop's University)

Abstract

We investigate the predictive power of hedonic models compared to that of pre-auction estimates in the context of art auctions. We use a panel data consisting of abstract paintings and a methodology that employs the estimates as instrumental variables in the framework of a hedonic regression model. The results suggest that hedonic models have no better predictive power than that of the estimates. Pre-auction estimates appear to fully account for the available public information on works of art.

Suggested Citation

  • Calin Valsan & Robert Sproule, 2006. "Hedonic Models and Pre-Auction Estimates: Abstract Art Revisited," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 26(5), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06z10132
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

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    2. Lisa Farrell & Jane M. Fry & Tim R. L. Fry, 2018. "Determinants of sales and price at auction for three Australian Indigenous artists: to pool or not to pool?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 42(3), pages 507-520, August.
    3. Alex Gershkov & Flavio Toxvaerd, 2013. "On seller estimates and buyer returns," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 47-55, May.
    4. Charlin, Ventura & Cifuentes, Arturo, 2020. "An options-based approach to analyze auction guarantees in the art market," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    5. Charlin, Ventura & Cifuentes, Arturo, 2013. "A new financial metric for the art market," MPRA Paper 50186, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Lisa Farrell & Tim R.L. Fry, 2017. "Pre-sale information and hammer prices for Australian Indigenous art," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(5), pages 483-500, November.
    7. Brunella Bruno & Emilia Garcia‐Appendini & Giacomo Nocera, 2018. "Experience and Brokerage in Asset Markets: Evidence from Art Auctions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 47(4), pages 833-864, December.
    8. François Maréchal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2012. "The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 323-330, December.
    9. Shailendra Gurjar & Usha Ananthakumar, 2023. "Presale Estimates and Auction Prices in Indian Art Market: Accuracy, Determinants and Motivations," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 21(3), pages 555-567, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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