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Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking

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  • Glazer, Amihai

Abstract

A Manager of other leader can more effectively obtain rents or other benefits for his organization the higher the quality of his staff. But these same staff may seek rents within the firm, with the most able staff best able to do so. A Manager may therefore prefer to employ staff of low quality.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 48 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 155-162

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:48:y:2002:i:2:p:155-162

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References

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  1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  3. Ronald Wintrobe, 2001. "How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist's view," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, 03.
  4. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-72, June.
  5. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  6. Paul R. Milgrom., 1987. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design," Economics Working Papers 8741, University of California at Berkeley.
  7. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, October.
  8. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-17, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Jay Pil Choi & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Jaesoo Kim, 2011. "Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 025, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers 0016, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  3. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
  4. Wagner, Alexander F, 2011. "Relational contracts when the agent's productivity inside the relationship is correlated with outside opportunities," CEPR Discussion Papers 8378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2012. "How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 579-594, March.
  6. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 807, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Indraneel Dasgupta, . "‘Living’ wage, class conflict and ethnic strife," Discussion Papers 08/08, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
  8. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse27_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov, 2011. "Incumbency Advantage in Nondemocratic Elections," 2011 Meeting Papers 417, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Elie Appelbaum, 2006. "Strategic extremism," Working Papers 2006_12, York University, Department of Economics.
  11. Münster, Johannes & Staal, Klaas, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 75, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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