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Self-managed working time and employee effort: Theory and evidence

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  • Beckmann, Michael
  • Cornelissen, Thomas
  • Kräkel, Matthias

Abstract

This paper theoretically and empirically examines the impact of self-managed working time (SMWT) on employee effort. As a policy of increased worker autonomy, SMWT can theoretically increase effort via intrinsic motivation and reciprocal behaviour, but it can also lead to a decrease of effort due to a loss of control. Based on German individual-level panel data, we find that SMWT employees exert higher effort levels than employees with fixed working hours. Even after accounting for observed and unobserved characteristics there remains a modest positive effect. This effect is largely driven by employees who are intrinsically motivated, suggesting that intrinsic motivation is complementary to SMWT. However, reciprocal work intensification does not seem to be an important channel of providing extra effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Beckmann, Michael & Cornelissen, Thomas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Self-managed working time and employee effort: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 285-302.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:133:y:2017:i:c:p:285-302
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.013
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Self-managed working time; Worker autonomy; Employee effort; Reciprocity; Intrinsic motivation; Complementarity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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