Which mechanisms support the fulfillment of sales agreements?: Asking decision-makers in firms
AbstractThe paper proposes a methodology to obtain evidence on the relative importance of different mechanisms for supporting agreements. A survey question posed to company directors summarizes key aspects of mechanisms and asks for judgments on use. In contrast to existing approaches, the data covers the full complement of mechanisms and much economic activity, offering aggregate numerical judgments. The methodology is applied in Romania. Popular hypotheses are examined. Bilateralism is numerically dominant; the legal system is used extensively; third-party mechanisms are less important. These three mechanisms are non-complementary.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 78 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Kathryn Hendley & Peter Murrell, 2003. "Which mechanisms support the fulfillment of sales agreements? Asking decision-makers in firm," Electronic Working Papers 03-002, University of Maryland, Department of Economics.
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- P2 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies
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