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Hitelesek-e a vállalkozások ígéretei Magyarországon?
[Do Hungarian entrepreneurs make credible promises?]

Author

Listed:
  • Mike, Károly
  • Kiss, Gábor

Abstract

A piaci csere mindig ígéretek cseréje, és a benne részt vevők számára az egyik legnagyobb kihívás, hogy ígéreteiket hitelessé tegyék. A tanulmány a hitelesség közgazdasági elméletét áttekintve amellett érvel, hogy a hitelesség széles körű megteremtéséhez elsősorban megfelelő szankciókat nyújtó intézményekre van szükség. Egy - cégvezetők körében elvégzett - kérdőíves felmérés alapján vizsgálja a hitelesség jelenlétét a magyar vállalkozások közötti üzleti kapcsolatokban, továbbá a cégek hajlandóságát arra, hogy ismeretlenekkel lépjenek kapcsolatra. Feltárja továbbá, milyen szerződéskikényszerítő intézményekre hagyatkoznak a vállalkozások. Szemben a Magyarországot jellemző "bizalomhiány" tézisével, az adatok a hitelesség széles körű jelenlétét jelzik. Sok cég lép túl személyes és üzleti kapcsolathálóján, és teremti meg a hitelességet e körön túl. Dominálnak a személyes cserét támogató játékszabályok, de az intézményi rend határozott "nyugatias" vonásokat is mutat.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: K12, L14, O17.

Suggested Citation

  • Mike, Károly & Kiss, Gábor, 2017. "Hitelesek-e a vállalkozások ígéretei Magyarországon? [Do Hungarian entrepreneurs make credible promises?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1285-1315.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1740
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2017.12.1285
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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