Law, Relationships, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprises
AbstractWe examine how Russian enterprises do business with one another, focusing on the strategies used to obtain efficiency and predictability in their transactions. Using survey data, the paper analyzes the relative importance of relational contracting, self-enforcement, enterprise networks, private security firms, administrative institutions, and courts. Enterprise-to-enterprise negotiations are preferred, but courts are used when disputes resist resolution through negotiation. Consistently, little evidence suggests enterprises resort to private enforcement, indicating overstatement in the supposed connection between weakness in law and the mafia's rise. Legacies of the old administrative enforcement mechanisms are few, although enterprise networks from Soviet days remain resilient.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics in its series Electronic Working Papers with number 98-001.
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742
Web page: http://www.econ.umd.edu/
Postal: Ms. Elizabeth Martinez, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742
Other versions of this item:
- Kathryn Hendley & Peter Murrell & Randi Ryterman, 1998. "Law, Relationship, and Private Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of Russian Enterprise," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 72, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- P50 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
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