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Content
May 2006, Volume 55, Issue 2
- 297-320 Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
by Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E.
- 321-330 Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets
by Sandholm, Tuomas & Suri, Subhash
- 331-339 Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power
by Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A.
- 340-371 A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information
by Chong, Juin-Kuan & Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck H.
- 372-384 Efficient priority rules
by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina
- 385-406 Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations--The anonymous case
by Smorodinsky, Rann & Tennenholtz, Moshe
April 2006, Volume 55, Issue 1
- 1-20 Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
by Amir, Rabah & Stepanova, Anna
- 21-42 The evolution of focal points
by Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry
- 43-71 Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
by de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Pechlivanos, Lambros
- 72-99 Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
by Fujimoto, Katsushige & Kojadinovic, Ivan & Marichal, Jean-Luc
- 100-111 Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem
by Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio
- 112-130 Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution
by Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam
- 131-151 Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
by Lebrun, Bernard
- 152-188 Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
by Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves
- 189-206 Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
by Noussair, Charles & Silver, Jonathon
February 2006, Volume 54, Issue 2
- 241-260 Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity
by Chambers, Christopher P.
- 261-292 Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
by Dindos, Martin & Mezzetti, Claudio
- 293-315 A theory of reciprocity
by Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs
- 316-335 Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
by Faure-Grimaud, A. & Reiche, S.
- 336-352 Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
by Gale, Douglas & Sabourian, Hamid
- 353-372 Network formation with heterogeneous players
by Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen
- 373-379 The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games
by Llerena, Francesc & Rafels, Carles
- 380-397 Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
by Montero, Maria
- 398-418 Allocation problems among sharing groups
by Rhee, Sangkyu
- 419-429 A note on a value with incomplete communication
by Bilbao, J.M. & Jimenez, N. & Lopez, J.J.
- 430-440 Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
by Chambers, Christopher P. & Hayashi, Takashi
January 2006, Volume 54, Issue 1
- 1-24 Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
by Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis
- 25-30 The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note
by Bhattacharya, Anindya & Ziad, Abderrahmane
- 31-46 Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry
by Chakraborty, Indranil
- 47-76 Approval voting with endogenous candidates
by Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P.
- 77-94 Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
by Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- 95-114 Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games
by Engle-Warnick, J. & Slonim, Robert L.
- 115-133 Parametric rationing methods
by Kaminski, Marek M.
- 134-158 An experimental study of price dispersion
by Morgan, John & Orzen, Henrik & Sefton, Martin
- 159-182 Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining
by Mullin, Charles H. & Reiley, David H.
- 183-204 Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
by Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard
- 205-225 The nucleolus of balanced simple flow networks
by Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Biswas, Amit
- 226-240 The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies
by Wickelgren, Abraham L.
November 2005, Volume 53, Issue 2
- 151-169 Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games
by Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew
- 170-207 Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions
by Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan
- 208-230 A folk theorem for minority games
by Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco
- 231-247 Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
by Takahashi, Satoru
- 248-261 Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
by Toda, Manabu
- 262-268 Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory
by Zambrano, Eduardo
- 269-270 B. Peleg and P. Sudholter, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games, Kluwer Academic, Boston (2003) ISBN 1-4020-7410-7 378 pages
by Maschler, Michael
October 2005, Volume 53, Issue 1
- 1-14 Ordinal versus cardinal complementarity: The case of Cournot oligopoly
by Amir, Rabah
- 15-42 Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
by Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres
- 43-58 Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem
by Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid
- 59-72 Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
by Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R.
- 73-82 Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example
by de Clippel, Geoffroy
- 83-109 Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory
by Ely, Jeffrey C. & Sandholm, William H.
- 110-125 Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning
by Hopkins, Ed & Posch, Martin
- 126-140 Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
by Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry
- 141-147 Fee versus royalty reconsidered
by Sen, Debapriya
August 2005, Volume 52, Issue 2
- 201-212 Neuroeconomics: Present and future
by Rustichini, Aldo
- 213-256 Physiological utility theory and the neuroeconomics of choice
by Glimcher, Paul W. & Dorris, Michael C. & Bayer, Hannah M.
- 257-282 A brain imaging study of the choice procedure
by Rustichini, Aldo & Dickhaut, John & Ghirardato, Paolo & Smith, Kip & Pardo, Jose V.
- 283-304 Employing labor-supply theory to measure the reward value of electrical brain stimulation
by Conover, Kent L. & Shizgal, Peter
- 305-315 Neurally reconstructing expected utility
by Knutson, Brian & Peterson, Richard
- 316-335 Economics and emotion: Institutions matter
by Smith, Kip & Dickhaut, John
- 336-372 The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision
by Bechara, Antoine & Damasio, Antonio R.
- 373-385 Identifying individual differences: An algorithm with application to Phineas Gage
by Houser, Daniel & Bechara, Antoine & Keane, Michael & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon
- 386-409 Experimental tests of the Somatic Marker hypothesis
by Leland, Jonathan W. & Grafman, Jordan
- 410-423 Deconstructing the law of effect
by Gallistel, C.R.
- 424-459 Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence
by Bhatt, Meghana & Camerer, Colin F.
- 460-492 Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption-saving decisions
by Benhabib, Jess & Bisin, Alberto
July 2005, Volume 52, Issue 1
- 1-19 Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model
by Aramendia, Miguel & Larrea, Concepcion & Ruiz, Luis
- 20-33 Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players
by Calvo, Emilio & Peters, Hans
- 34-53 Stability in dynamic matching markets
by Damiano, Ettore & Lam, Ricky
- 54-93 Subjective reasoning--dynamic games
by Feinberg, Yossi
- 94-132 Subjective reasoning--solutions
by Feinberg, Yossi
- 133-152 Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
by Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed
- 153-185 House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
by Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M.
- 186-200 Divide-and-permute
by Thomson, William
May 2005, Volume 51, Issue 2
- 237-242 Special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey
by Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 243-263 A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence
by Turocy, Theodore L.
- 264-295 Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games
by McLennan, Andrew & Berg, Johannes
- 296-323 Random belief equilibrium in normal form games
by Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio
- 324-348 Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game
by Yi, Kang-Oh
- 349-364 An experimental study of costly coordination
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A.
- 365-390 Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
by Frechette, Guillaume R. & Kagel, John H. & Morelli, Massimo
- 391-419 Storable votes
by Casella, Alessandra
- 420-444 Strongly stable networks
by Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne
- 445-463 Sequential voting with abstention
by Battaglini, Marco
- 464-489 Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
by Meirowitz, Adam
- 490-522 Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
by Duggan, John & Fey, Mark
- 523-536 Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
by Patty, John Wiggs
- 537-541 Counterfactuals in wonderland
by Samet, Dov
April 2005, Volume 51, Issue 1
- 1-19 Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
by Chillemi, Ottorino
- 20-30 Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
by Dubey, Pradeep & Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori
- 31-62 Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence
by Duffy, John & Hopkins, Ed
- 63-82 Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games
by Hokari, Toru
- 83-108 Stationary equilibria in discounted stochastic games with weakly interacting players
by Horst, Ulrich
- 109-127 Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
by Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland
- 128-154 Allocation rules for network games
by Jackson, Matthew O.
- 155-170 Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
by Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard
- 171-192 Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle
by Selten, Reinhard & Apesteguia, Jose
- 193-212 A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure
by van den Brink, Rene & van der Laan, Gerard
- 213-227 Contests with multiple rounds
by Yildirim, Huseyin
- 228-232 Persistent retracts and preparation
by Voorneveld, Mark
February 2005, Volume 50, Issue 2
- 129-142 Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims
by Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William
- 143-154 Two remarks on the inner core
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico
- 155-177 Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining
by Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus
- 178-207 Network formation and social coordination
by Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando
- 208-224 Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence
by Harris, Christopher J. & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B. & Zame, William R.
- 225-254 Strategy-proof risk sharing
by Ju, Biung-Ghi
- 255-277 Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice
by Mandler, Michael
- 278-311 Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
by Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno
- 312-331 A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
by Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv
- 332-365 Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games
by Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
January 2005, Volume 50, Issue 1
- 1-2 David Schmeidler
by Karni, Edi & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 3-27 Aggregate behavior and microdata
by Hildenbrand, Werner & Kneip, Alois
- 28-41 Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions
by Karni, Edi
- 42-57 Updating non-additive probabilities-- a geometric approach
by Lehrer, Ehud
- 58-78 Core convergence with asymmetric information
by McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 79-88 Strategic dropouts
by Orzach, Ram & Tauman, Yair
- 89-106 A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players
by Samet, Dov & Safra, Zvi
- 107-125 Decision-foundations for properties of nonadditive measures: general state spaces or general outcome spaces
by Wakker, Peter P.
November 2004, Volume 49, Issue 2
- 221-243 On coalitional semivalues
by Albizuri, M. Josune & Zarzuelo, Jose M.
- 244-259 Stochastic imitation in finite games
by Josephson, Jens & Matros, Alexander
- 260-287 Best response equivalence
by Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi
- 288-312 A model of the origins of basic property rights
by Muthoo, Abhinay
- 313-344 Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
- 345-362 Efficient spatial competition
by Stuart, Harborne Jr.
- 363-373 Program equilibrium
by Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 374-400 The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
by Vardy, Felix
- 401-423 An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
by Morgan, John & Vardy, Felix
- 424-434 Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
by Amoros, Pablo
October 2004, Volume 49, Issue 1
- 1-30 NP-completeness in hedonic games
by Ballester, Coralio
- 31-48 A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
by Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarkar, Palash
- 49-80 Dynamic interactive epistemology
by Board, Oliver
- 81-102 Non-excludable public good experiments
by Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu
- 103-116 Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
by Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton
- 117-134 The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
by Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella
- 135-156 Rationalizability for social environments
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
- 157-170 Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
by Kibris, Ozgur
- 171-214 Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
by Stegeman, Mark & Rhode, Paul
- 215-219 Reviews and Comments
by Moldovanu, Benny
August 2004, Volume 48, Issue 2
- 203-222 Stochastic stability in a double auction
by Agastya, Murali
- 223-248 Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Kar, Anirban
- 249-270 In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
by Ehlers, Lars
- 271-291 Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
by Hain, Roland & Mitra, Manipushpak
- 292-320 Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
by Koessler, Frederic
- 321-336 Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
by Kuzmics, Christoph
- 337-354 Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
by Papai, Szilvia
- 355-384 Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views
by Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J.
- 385-402 On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
by Shimoji, Makoto
- 403-414 Preparation
by Voorneveld, Mark
July 2004, Volume 48, Issue 1
- 1-17 Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
by Cantala, David
- 18-28 Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
by Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Xue, Licun
- 29-53 Successful uninformed bidding
by Hernando-Veciana, Angel
- 54-85 An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Moldovanu, Benny
- 86-93 The coalition structure core is accessible
by Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc
- 94-110 Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
by Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
- 111-123 Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
by Mutuswami, Suresh & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 124-138 Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents
by Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris C.
- 139-153 Bargaining with an agenda
by O'Neill, Barry & Samet, Dov & Wiener, Zvi & Winter, Eyal
- 154-170 Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
by Schummer, James
- 171-200 Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games
by Slikker, Marco & Norde, Henk
May 2004, Volume 47, Issue 2
- 237-256 Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
by Bonanno, Giacomo
- 257-267 On weighted Kalai-Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games
by Chun, Youngsub
- 268-298 A theory of sequential reciprocity
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg
- 299-324 Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
by Eso, Peter & Schummer, James
- 325-352 An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow
by Friedman, Eric & Shor, Mikhael & Shenker, Scott & Sopher, Barry
- 353-388 Random-player games
by Milchtaich, Igal
- 389-403 Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
by Roughgarden, Tim & Tardos, Eva
- 404-420 Endogenous price leadership
by van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak
- 421-452 Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity
by Westermark, Andreas
- 453-453 Erratum to "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games": [Games Econ. Behav. 46 (2004) 240-259]
by Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone
April 2004, Volume 47, Issue 1
- 1-35 Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies
by Al-Najjar, Nabil I.
- 36-71 Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
by Archer, Aaron & Feigenbaum, Joan & Krishnamurthy, Arvind & Sami, Rahul & Shenker, Scott
- 72-86 Observational learning under imperfect information
by Celen, Bogachan & Kariv, Shachar
- 87-103 Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
by Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov
- 104-123 Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
by Holzman, Ron & Kfir-Dahav, Noa & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 124-156 Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
by Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan
- 157-171 Belief-based equilibrium
by Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann
- 172-199 Games with espionage
by Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat
- 200-220 Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
by Spiegler, Ran
- 221-233 Individually rational pure strategies in large games
by Stanford, William
February 2004, Volume 46, Issue 2
- 221-239 Does observation influence learning?
by Armantier, Olivier
- 240-259 Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games
by Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone
- 260-281 How to identify trust and reciprocity
by Cox, James C.
- 282-303 Learning to play Bayesian games
by Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K.
- 304-324 Learning with perfect information
by Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori
- 325-347 A characterization of strategic complementarities
by Echenique, Federico
- 348-364 Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities
by Echenique, Federico
- 365-382 A model of noisy introspection
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A.
- 383-397 Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions
by Kim, Jinwoo & Che, Yeon-Koo
- 398-409 Learning by matching patterns
by Lambson, Val E. & Probst, Daniel A.
- 410-424 The averaging mechanism
by Naeve-Steinweg, E.
- 425-433 A note on one-shot public mediated talk
by Di Tillio, Alfredo
January 2004, Volume 46, Issue 1
- 1-22 Word-of-mouth learning
by Banerjee, Abhijit & Fudenberg, Drew
- 23-40 Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium
by Burton, Anthony & Sefton, Martin
- 41-54 A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy
by De Sinopoli, Francesco
- 55-75 When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
by Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben
- 76-87 Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining
by Kibris, Ozgur
- 88-114 Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods
by Olszewski, Wojciech
- 115-128 On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment
by Phelan, Christopher
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