IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v64y2008i1p329-334.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the use of menus in sequential common agency

Author

Listed:
  • Calzolari, Giacomo
  • Pavan, Alessandro

Abstract

We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.

Suggested Citation

  • Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2008. "On the use of menus in sequential common agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 329-334, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:329-334
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(08)00011-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pavan, Alessandro & Calzolari, Giacomo, 2009. "Sequential contracting with multiple principals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 503-531, March.
    2. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
    3. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pavan, Alessandro & Calzolari, Giacomo, 2009. "Sequential contracting with multiple principals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 503-531, March.
    2. Peters, Michael, 2010. "On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-18, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
    3. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sequential contracting Mechanism design Menus theorems;

    JEL classification:

    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:329-334. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.