On the use of menus in sequential common agency
We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2008.
"Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals,"
1499, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals," Discussion Papers 1457, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2007. "Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals," CEPR Discussion Papers 6562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Peters, Michael, 2001.
"Common Agency and the Revelation Principle,"
Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002.
"The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
- Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:329-334. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.