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Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Giacomo Bonanno, 2022. "Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-20, October.
  2. Di Tillio, Alfredo & Halpern, Joseph Y. & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Conditional belief types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 253-268.
  3. Ken Binmore, 1997. "Rationality and backward induction," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 23-41.
  4. Alfredo Di Tillio & Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "The predictive role of counterfactuals," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 167-182, February.
  5. Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2017. "Uncertain information structures and backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 135-151.
  6. Samet, Dov, 2013. "Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 192-200.
  7. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
  8. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  9. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Dov Samet, 2011. "Strategies and interactive beliefs in dynamic games," Working Papers 375, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  10. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 247-273, September.
  11. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  12. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1997. "An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability," Working Papers 1009, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  13. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
  14. Giacomo Bonanno, 2012. "Epistemic foundations of game theory," Working Papers 70, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  15. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2014. "A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 221-241.
  16. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
  17. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2004. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Research Memorandum 032, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  18. Samet, Dov, 2005. "Counterfactuals in wonderland," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 537-541, May.
  19. Skyrms, Brian & Bell, Gary D. & Woodruff, Peter, 1999. "Theories of counter-factual and subjunctive conditionals in contexts of strategic interaction," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 275-291, September.
  20. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
  21. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 9, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  22. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
  23. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 60, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  24. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  25. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
  26. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
  27. Johan Van Benthem & Eric Pacuit & Olivier Roy, 2011. "Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-35, February.
  28. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2001. "Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 425-435, November.
  29. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  30. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
  31. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 159, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  32. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2006. "Epistemic foundations for backward induction: an overview," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  33. Raymond Deneckere & Meng-Yu Liang, 2001. "Bargaining with Interdependent Values," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20017, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  34. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.
  35. Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
  36. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 132, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  37. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  38. Cyril Hédoin, 2016. "Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-17, November.
  39. Giacomo Bonanno, 2018. "Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 1001-1032, September.
  40. Joseph Y. Halpern & Rafael Pass, 2018. "Game theory with translucent players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 949-976, September.
  41. Giacomo Bonanno, 2021. "Rational play in games: A behavioral approach," Working Papers 344, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  42. Ken Binmore, "undated". "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge," ELSE working papers 008, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  43. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1998. "Counter-Counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 175-180, July.
  44. Thorsten Clausing, 2003. "Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 315-336, June.
  45. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.
  46. Feinberg, Yossi, 2005. "Subjective reasoning--dynamic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 54-93, July.
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