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Counterfactuals in Wonderland

Author

Listed:
  • Dov Samet

    (Faculty of Management Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

The literary source of the main ideas in Aumann's article ``Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality" is exposed and analyzed. The primordial archetypal images that underlie both this literary source and Aumann's work are delineated and are used to explain the great emotive impact that this work had on the community of game theorists.

Suggested Citation

  • Dov Samet, 1997. "Counterfactuals in Wonderland," Game Theory and Information 9703002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9703002
    Note: Type of Document - postscript; pages: 7. Also posted in newsgroup rec.dont.be.too.serious
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Samet, Dov, 1996. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 230-251, December.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
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    Cited by:

    1. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    counterfactuals; backward induction; rationality; archetypes; Easter eggs; post modernism; Snark;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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